


JPRS-NEA-93-030

8 March 1993



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-93-030

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8 March 1993

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Algerian Ambassador Discusses Domestic, Regional Affairs

93AF0330A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic  
10 Dec 92 p 6

[Interview with Ali Ben Mohamed, Algeria's new ambassador to Cairo, by Sumayah Ahmad; place and date not given: "Supreme Egyptian-Algerian Committee: We Rejected IMF's Demands and Started Austerity Measures"]

[Text] Ambassador Ali Ben Mohamed, Algeria's new ambassador to Cairo, spoke with AL-JUMHURIYAH for the first time. The ambassador's interview with the newspaper touched upon all the issues involved in the Arab course of action, the Maghreb course of action, relations between Egypt and Algeria, the past, the present, and future aspirations.

Ambassador Ali Ben Mohamed, who has a doctorate in literature, was a professor at the University of Algeria until 1990. He then served as minister of education [until] this year, when he became his country's ambassador to Cairo.

[Ahmad] What is your assessment of Algerian-Egyptian relations, and how can these relations be promoted?

[Mohamed] The roots of Algerian-Egyptian relations go far back into the political and cultural history of the Arab and Islamic nation.

I do not find it necessary to repeat the historical evidence that affirms this fact. Everyone in Egypt, in Algeria, and in the entire Arab homeland knows this. What I want to emphasize, however, is this: The skies over Algerian-Egyptian relations now are extremely clear, and there are no clouds whatsoever casting a shadow on those bright prospects. Egyptians and Algerians are always consulting with each other and coordinating their political activities and common positions with each other. The foundations of all of this lie in the desire to safeguard the security of the Arab nation and protect its strategic interests.

#### 'We Aspire to More Cooperation'

[Ahmad] Are you satisfied with the manner in which these historic relations are now being interpreted in the various areas of cooperation?

[Mohamed] Unfortunately, the volume of trade between the two countries is so small that it is quite negligible. At the same time, relations between countries now are such that they can be neither creative nor can they provide concrete rewards unless they are supported by trade and fruitful economic cooperation that benefit both parties.

During this coming year, we hope that we will be able to upgrade the various areas of cooperation so that we can increase the volume of commercial, industrial, and cultural relations and put them on par with the political

relations, which are excellent. The will to do that is there; the resources are available; the legal framework exists, and the goods that can be marketed in both countries are numerous and varied. Thus, the only thing that remains to be done is to put the train on the track and give it the signal to go.

#### Joint Committee Soon

[Ahmad] When will the two countries' joint committee hold its meetings, and what has that committee accomplished so far?

[Mohamed] The Algerian-Egyptian Supreme Joint Committee held its first round of meetings in Cairo in October 1990. The meetings, which were chaired by 'Amr Musa and Lakhdar Brahimi, the two countries' ministers of foreign affairs, culminated in the signing of seven agreements dealing with the most important areas of trade between the two countries.

Then last 24 and 25 October, the follow-up and steering committee for the second round of meetings held its meetings in Algiers. At that meeting, a review was conducted of the steps that were taken to give cooperation between the two countries a concrete shape and to strengthen trade between them. Also, agreement was reached on the next steps, which will be presented to the Supreme Joint Committee at its second round of meetings, which are to be held in the Algiers at the end of this month.

We hope that arrangements will be made at this meeting to stimulate trade and facilitate communications between businessmen in the two countries. We also hope that practical procedures will be determined and a number of systems and organizations will be set up for that same purpose.

#### Bill for Debts and Imports

[Ahmad] How is the economic situation in Algeria, now that a war economy is in place?

[Mohamed] First of all, I must explain how the term "war economy" is to be construed. This term, which is sometimes used in the Algerian press, was first used by Abdessalam Belaid, the head of government, before he assumed his present responsibilities. Belaid himself had explained that by using that term his purpose was to imply nothing more than strict compliance with operating procedures and with the wise rules of austerity so that the national economy can dedicate all the country's resources to confronting its real problems.

[Ahmad] How do you manage to come up with the hard currency which you need?

[Mohamed] It is no secret that our national economy is ailing and that it is afflicted now by the effects of the major disruptions that have occurred in its strategic balances. Our country's hard currency revenues come basically from petroleum and gas proceeds. The drop in energy prices had a destructive effect that drained the



country. Today, our debt payments are close to three-fourths of these proceeds, and the balance that is left after we pay that bill is not enough to pay for food, medicine, spare parts, and essential primary materials that we import. It is also not enough to pay for the components that are necessary to run our factories and the units of production.

The economic situation that I have just described in broad terms is the main culprit for the social crisis that manifests itself in unemployment, the disturbing effects of which are evident among young people who have graduated from schools and universities. The social crisis is also manifested in a declining standard of living, which is the result of inflation and the devaluation of our currency. h3  
IMF and US

[Ahmad] And yet we read that you are negotiating with international organizations that provide funding.

[Mohamed] What the international monetary institutions are proposing to us now to alleviate the pressure on us and loosen the noose that is pulled tightly around our neck is debt rescheduling. The Algerian authorities, however, are refusing to seek any measure that would reduce that pressure if our economic sovereignty were made subject to it, because that would ultimately compromise our sovereignty and have all kinds of implications. Algeria paid a very high price for our sovereignty: 1.5 million people paid for it with their lives. That is why today we would rather suffer than compromise our sovereignty, not even partially or temporarily.

[Ahmad] Isn't this a very high price to pay? Will citizens tolerate paying that high price?

[Mohamed] As long as our sovereignty is not infringed upon, cooperation with monetary institutions is something that we welcome. Our government's program relies basically on our own individual effort, and this means calling upon Algerians to enlist in economic warfare of the sort that requires society to make the necessary sacrifices. This means we would have to do without luxuries temporarily, and we would have to invest every dinar we earn in hard currency into restoring our economy's strategic equilibrium. We would have to invest in such a way as to make it possible for the units of production in our country to start up and take off. The investment process would thus be resumed, thereby cutting into the number of unemployed individuals. Production would be strengthened; the country would regain its vigor; a remedy for its crisis would have been found, and the harsh circumstances under which we are now toiling will have been overcome.

#### **Elections Are Not Among Our Priorities**

[Ahmad] Does the present domestic situation in Algeria permit you to hold legislative elections?

[Mohamed] Elections are neither on the government's agenda now, nor are they on the government's list of

priorities. What is on a list of urgent concerns is the search for an effective remedy for the country's economic and social conditions.

It is worth noting that government officials and members of the Supreme State Council have affirmed more than once that Algeria will stay the course of democracy and that it is now trying, first and foremost, to regain the people's confidence, restore respect to the state's institutions, and provide a climate of security and equanimity without which nothing can be achieved for the country.

[Ahmad] The late President Boudiaf had extended an invitation to all political parties to come together and to form a national union. Is that invitation still open?

[Mohamed] On several occasions, the Supreme State Council announced its adherence to this plan and to acting upon it. That posture manifested itself recently when a national organization was formed to oversee and revitalize this union. Regardless of the outside snafu assumed by the union that the late President Boudiaf had called for, what matters is that Algerians of all political schools of thought resolve to work toward one objective about which there can be no disagreement, namely, to protect Algeria from harm. What matters is that all Algerians resolve to work to provide prosperity and security for the people of Algeria and stability for its institutions and to revitalize its economy.

#### **Relations With Morocco Have Not Cooled**

[Ahmad] Where does the Maghreb Federation stand, particularly after the recent summit at Nouakchott?

[Mohamed] The meetings that were held recently on the Maghreb were significant milestones that allow us to measure the effort that has been made on the course of unity that is being sought. They were also milestones for evaluating the many programs that are being carried out in all sectors of activity to streamline plans and strengthen the factors of integration in the course of development in each one of the countries of the Arab Maghreb. I do not believe that the Nouakchott meeting departed from that course in any way.

[Ahmad] What about the cooling of relations between Algeria and Morocco?

[Mohamed] I believe that this is a truthful characterization of the [as published] existing relationship between the two countries. All of the information that is available indicates that matters are moving ahead in a normal and positive manner for the prospects of Maghreb action.

[Ahmad] What about the question of the Sahara? Does it not represent an obstacle?

[Mohamed] Our position is constant and has not changed. It is our position that international provisions are to be applied, and the Sahrawis are to be empowered to determine their destiny in accordance with rules that were approved by the United Nations and that were applied in many places. We see no reason for not

applying these rules to the people of the Sahara. Ultimately, it is the will of the Sahrawis, whatever that is, that must be respected. I believe that all of the parties are in agreement about the referendum, and all of the obstacles that have recently stood in the way of the referendum will have to be removed.

**Al-'Awadi on Environment, Waste of Funds, GCC**

93AE0260A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
29 Dec 92 pp 34, 35

[Interview with Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Awadi by Jasim al-Shamari in Kuwait; date not given]

[Text] Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Awadi entered the cabinet by way of the National Council, to which he was elected almost unanimously in 1975—a consensus rarely seen in Kuwaiti elections. He was chosen for the cabinet at that time and continued to serve as a cabinet member until the post-invasion cabinet was formed.

Al-'Awadi, currently executive secretary general of the Regional Organization for Marine Environmental Protection, has recently begun to forthrightly express his views on the administrative structure of the state.

In an interview with AL-MAJALLAH, al-'Awadi discussed a number of issues, particularly the Regional Organization for Marine Environmental Protection. He said that "the organization was created in order to teach environmental concepts in the region in line with legal and political agreements. It is the first organization to embrace all of the countries of the region in accordance with an overview that distinguishes it from ordinary organizations. The organization focuses on bodies of water that are endangered because of heavy shipping traffic or because of the possibility of sinking ships. This is what prompted us to go beyond political considerations to cover a wide region whose countries would have found it difficult to cooperate. Our objective is to raise environmental consciousness, develop [qualified] cadres, and create local interest. We have progressed nicely and have established a Bahrain-based emergency center to deal with environmental disasters and to coordinate among the nations of the region. [We embarked on] a unique and differentiated initiative this year by sponsoring the 100-Day Journey in cooperation with [a number of] international organizations. During the journey, which involved more than 140 scientists, a research vessel conducted a thorough and comprehensive survey of the entire Gulf.

"We are now in the process of establishing an information center to [analyze] the data collected," he said. "The conclusions of the research will be discussed at a seminar next January. I fear that this body of water will die if left unattended, especially in view of emerging signals, such as the dearth of fish catches. We attempted to get the world to share the burden of the region's environmental catastrophe, but some countries refused, allegedly because we are a rich nation. We are talking about billions of dollars here, which is beyond the region's

ability. We need \$1 billion for antipollution measures, not to mention needed studies. Pollution has contaminated the entire Kuwaiti coastline, as well as 500 km of the Saudi coastline, which has been hit the hardest by the environmental disaster. Ridding the sea of oil pollution requires \$1 billion, of which \$700 million is needed to clean the Saudi coastline and \$300 million to clean the Kuwaiti coastline."

[Al-Shamari] You have begun to write articles criticizing the administrative system in Kuwait and impediments to Kuwaiti development.

[Al-'Awadi] I believe that we do not fully comprehend the meaning of development. Generally speaking, we are a rich country, but our development remains erratic because we lack human, technical, and material resources. The riches we possess have been unable to transform us from a country with a single source of income to a country with diversified resources. I believe that even with technical know-how, development will stagnate if it is not accompanied by large-scale technological absorption capable of competing throughout the world. This brings us to another point. Our development will remain constrained unless there is total and comprehensive coordination in that respect among all of the Gulf states, after which we must identify development projects in the world that will serve our needs. This means that all foreign lending or assistance must be linked to domestic requirements. Unfortunately, this regional developmental dimension is lacking.

The fourth impediment is a weak private sector that has become parasitic, feeding on the public sector because the government owns all of the means of development. We have not dealt with development in the private sector as perpetual, and we depend on the government for everything. Government participation in major projects is an impediment to true development because the private sector does not compete abroad and limits itself to subsidized domestic production. Furthermore, our educational system is not geared to raising steadfast Kuwaiti individuals ready to venture out. Our system simply develops government employees. [University] graduates are only interested in securing government jobs, which is a major suppressant of Kuwaiti individualism and a major stumbling block to future human initiative.

**Planning Crisis**

[Al-Shamari] Does this mean that we have a planning crisis?

[Al-'Awadi] An open economy involves no planning. You devise indicators that people heed. The more centralization, the easier the planning. This is what we observed about the former socialist camp. We have failed at planning not because we lack a plan, but because our plans are drawn for the government and are not meant for overall development that could change the Kuwaiti individual and transform him into a producer.

We also lack a system that will make it mandatory for the private sector to absorb the Kuwaiti labor force.

[Al-Shamari] What are your views on turning future services over [privatizing] to companies?

[Al-'Awadi] That could herald improvements in services. I only ask that such companies be obliged to absorb the Kuwaiti individual, taking him out of the nonproductive government sector, putting him into the productive private sector, and then holding him accountable and rewarding him accordingly.

[Al-Shamari] How do you assess government performance?

[Al-'Awadi] Government performance in general is not of a desirable standard and could be improved. The problem lies with existing systems and with restrictions that restrain initiative and competition. I believe that there will be no performance improvement until we liberalize the government apparatus and give it the freedom to deal with everyone on a productive basis.

[Al-Shamari] It is odd to hear this assessment from somebody who was a cabinet member for more than 15 years.

[Al-'Awadi] To put it bluntly, I was unable to put my theories into practice. I tried. Let's take the Ministry of Health as an example. When I saw that we achieved adequate quantitative growth, I wanted to move on to qualitative growth. I called for health security and for a structural system. If you refer back to our plans for those years, you will find this to have been my own personal orientation to which the government was not responsive because we have the wrong idea about employment and about the government's responsibility to place all Kuwaitis. This is a political consideration that we have been unable to shake off, either at the National Assembly level or at the government level. It is my view that the two bodies are competing to lure citizens, which is the worst harm they can do to them. The articles of the Constitution are misconstrued in this regard.

[Al-Shamari] But aren't we the ones who promulgate the laws, and not the other way around?

[Al-'Awadi] The problem arises when gaps exist among legislators, those entrusted with the execution of the laws, and those in charge of oversight. The problem with our plan for 1985 was that the state's administrative apparatus was not ready to accept any plan. It is difficult to follow a plan if you do not think about planning.

#### Public Funds

[Al-Shamari] There is a lot of talk about wasted public funds. What do you think?

[Al-'Awadi] Public funds are meant to secure the country against catastrophes and they are more productive in our country than they are in any of our neighboring countries. Kuwait has weathered two crises, and without these

crises the subject of public funds would not have come up. The first was the al-Manakh crisis, and the second was the banking crisis, which highlighted the ineptitude in utilizing, managing, rescuing, or resolving crises. Public funds are meant to rescue the country rather than individuals, but we have been unsuccessful in doing so. As to construction and rehabilitation projects, the Tender Committee and the Accounting Bureau provide with adequate controls. I believe that the quality of disbursement—and I am talking preinvasion—was good. As a matter of fact, most of the projects have been completed at half of what they would have cost in other countries.

[Al-Shamari] What about the misuse of public funds for personal gain?

[Al-'Awadi] I do not believe that anybody got to rich by directly misusing or embezzling public funds or through malfeasance to the degree that is commonly believed in Kuwait. If such instances indeed exist, you can be sure that they did not have the approval of either the political system or the government.

[Al-Shamari] Are you speaking for the government now?

[Al-'Awadi] I am one of the severest critics of the period during which I was in government service. I simply talk on the basis of my firsthand experiences.

#### 2 August Case

[Al-Shamari] As a member of the cabinet at the time of the invasion, what do you believe the current dossier on the 2 August rumors to be all about?

[Al-'Awadi] I believe that it is every Kuwaiti's right to know everything there is to know about that catastrophe. There should be disclosure in the manner that is common throughout the world. A group of trustworthy people must conduct an investigation and ascertain the facts. To entrust that function to the National Assembly or to the government would be a mistake, in my opinion, and all of the facts would not come out.

I demand that a team of impartial Kuwaitis be appointed by the amir and given full authority to proceed in the manner that they see fit to give all of the people an opportunity to testify to the facts in their possession. The testimony would then be documented to the authorities and referred to the judiciary. Those who come forward should be rewarded.

It is our duty to keep this affair above politics, because we are dealing here with a period of history about which everyone has a right to know all of the facts, without embellishment by the National Assembly, the media, or anybody else.

[Al-Shamari] But isn't that the constitutional prerogative of the National Assembly?

[Al-'Awadi] Not at all. The National Assembly has no authority to investigate the actions of former ministers.



That right is vested only in the judiciary. Is it so difficult to find 10 Kuwaitis who can be vested with full impunity and authority to deal with that issue? There has to be an impartial committee to document that period for the sake of history.

[Al-Shamari] What testimony will you give?

[Al-'Awadi] I will wait until I hear what others have to say, but my testimony will be driven by the fact that no matter what our pretexts are, we remain flawed by pursuing and maintaining a policy of straddling the fence in relation to those around us, when we should have taken steps that might not have been satisfactory to us.

#### Gulf Cooperation Council

[Al-Shamari] How do you envision the future of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]?

[Al-'Awadi] I see no great hope for cooperation. It is very unfortunate that we have failed to achieve many of the components [needed to realize] the aspirations that we all had. Current developments prove that we continue to look at the GCC as some sort of luxury. I believe that there will be no real cooperation until the borders are abolished and the door is open to all of the people of the Gulf.

[Al-Shamari] What impediments are there?

[Al-'Awadi] We go back to bureaucracy and to the wide disparity between fact and fiction. We are still constrained by specific formalities such as customs and security [considerations]. We are but one nation, and I do not believe that one state can remain secure if another is being harmed. This became apparent during the invasion of Kuwait—an experience that removed geographic boundaries and reasserted the union of Gulf people. I wish that the political leadership would be convinced of that. Let us begin bilaterally or trilaterally—at least with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Let us work gradually. I believe that if we do not remove those minor formalities, the existence of the GCC will do more harm than good.

[Al-Shamari] Do you fear domination by Iran?

[Al-'Awadi] I fear domination by any other country, not just Iran—even social domination, not just military or political. We can see that if we look at the GCC's population mix. Iran will never be able to dominate and will never be allowed to do so. Iran would be mistaken if it thinks that it can dominate, but I do not believe that the Iranians are that stupid. We must strengthen ourselves without regard to the reasons why other countries are powerful.

#### GCC Official Discusses Recent Summit

93AE0266A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 29 Dec 92  
p 10

[Article by Shafiq al-Asadi: "Many Obstacles Still Impede Implementation of Gulf Economic Agreement"]

[Text] Dr. 'Abdallah al-Quwayz, the assistant secretary general for economic affairs for the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], asserted that the 13th Gulf summit, which ended on 23 December 1992 in Abu Dhabi, resulted in an agreement on unified customs tariffs (4 to 7 percent). The gradual application of these tariffs, beginning in March 1994, will confirm the GCC nations' credibility and their commitment to implementing the principles contained in the unified economic agreement.

However, at a seminar held in Abu Dhabi on 28 December, under the title *Economic Legislation in the United Arab Emirates [UAE]. Applications and Results*, Dr. al-Quwayz revealed that many obstacles still impede the implementation of the economic agreement, including what can be legislated and applied. He stressed that 504 economic cases have been brought before the GCC secretary general.

Al-Quwayz pointed out that the agreement on customs tariffs had met with difficulties before final agreement was reached. He said that previously, minimum and maximum limits had been put on tariffs, ranging between 4 and 20 percent on foreign goods. During the initial beginnings of the council's work, agreement had been reached on lists of foreign goods to be exempted from customs duties. However, the GCC was unable to draft a unified customs tariff agreement in the time specified by the unified economic agreement (March 1986). This date has been changed three times, and this has enveloped the council in clouds of doubt about its ability to commit to its resolutions.

Al-Quwayz emphasized that the most important GCC goals were in the fields of oil, finance, trade, and customs, as well as support for progress in industry, mining, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and services, establishing joint projects, and encouraging the private sector. He said: "From this point of departure, the unified economic agreement was comprehensive in terms of economic and commercial cooperation."

Al-Quwayz explained that, with regard to the unified economic agreement, it has been only a short time since the emergence of the principles set forth in bilateral economic agreements, which had been established in most GCC countries before the GCC was established. The unified agreement was signed over a period of not more than five months (25 May to 11 November 1981). It was not expected to include all of the steps required to implement the provisions contained in it, taking into consideration the legal structures in each member state.

He added that the practical application of the agreement's provisions requires some time for the member

nations to achieve harmony between their economic conditions and the unified economic agreement's requirements. Sufficient time had to be given to study differences among the countries in all economic fields and to propose measures necessary to amend their situations. It was agreed that the GCC direction was toward creating a common market.

Al-Quwayz referred to Article 8 of the agreement, which stipulates that the member nations agree to implementing principles to guarantee that GCC citizens can conduct business in any of the GCC countries, without distinction or discrimination, in areas that form the backbone of economic unity. This includes freedom of movement, labor, and residence, the right to property and inheritance, the right to pursue economic activity, and freedom to move capital.

With regard to the working paper that he submitted to the seminar, titled *Legal Aspects of and Obstacles to Implementing the Unified Economic Agreement*, Dr. al-Quwayz said that the agreement forms a clear framework for what economic relations among the GCC nations ought to be. It has motivated the nations to draw up principles and bases to prepare the way for economic unity. He pointed out that the economic resolutions, issued by the GCC's Supreme Council, have been implemented consecutively, beginning with the third summit held in Bahrain in 1982. Resolutions of Gulf summits have covered the following economic fields:

- Exempting products of national origin from customs duties and similar fees. The volume of intertrade has increased from about 3 percent of the total GCC trade at the time application of the agreement began to more than 7 percent last year.
- Permitting the pursuit of a number of economic activities, such as manufacturing, agriculture, certain services, both retail and wholesale trade; most professions, such as medicine, law, accounting, and investment; and all crafts in accordance with established rules. That began at the end of 1973, for native and legal persons, most of whom were licensed by the UAE.
- Treating the means of transportation, which are fully owned by citizens of GCC countries, as a national means of transportation.
- Permitting the ownership of shares in new companies that pursue permissible activities and in joint companies. There are 122 companies in which GCC citizens have the right to own stock.
- Permitting the ownership of real estate for the purpose of residence. Since the start of this decision, 5,775 citizens—or 38 percent—own property in the UAE.
- Approving the qualifying of GCC citizens to obtain easy loans from industrial lending institutions. The number of beneficiaries from this decision, up to the end of 1991, totaled more than 40 joint projects. The amount of the loans related to these projects is 1.4 billion Saudi riyals.

- Permitting production units in any member state to export to the rest of the GCC countries, without any need for a local agent. Permission was also given to them to open offices to display and distribute their products directly.
- Giving GCC national and legal persons operating in any member state the same tax treatment as its own citizens.
- Equality in treatment by educational organizations on the various levels.
- Equality in obtaining medical treatment.
- Creating several institutions, such as the Gulf Investment Institute, the Board of Specifications and Standards, the Technical Office for Communications, the Patent Office, the Joint Office for the International Civil Air Organization, and joint representation in certain international organizations.

#### Data on Industrial Investments in Gulf Region

93AE0285A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
29 Dec 92 p 10

[Report from Doha: "Secretary General of Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting: Gulf Region Is in Industrial Era With All Its Complications"]

[Text] 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Ja'fari, secretary general of Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, said that the challenge for Gulf industrialists is to identify the means and requirements for entering the industrial field and persevering in it. He emphasized that industrialization is important for the social development of the Gulf and that it calls for diligence in teaching and implementing modern management techniques.

The secretary general of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting said that the Gulf region has embarked on a new stage of development—an era of industrialization with attendant complications and accelerating developments.

Al-Ja'fari cited figures to prove the success of industrialization in the Gulf region. In a sample of 10 metallurgical facilities, the average capital is in excess of \$52 million, and capacity utilization is at 130 percent. In a sample of 21 cement factories, the average capital is \$168 million, and capacity utilization is close to 80 percent. In a sample of 94 petrochemical and plastics facilities, the average capital is about \$24 million, and capacity utilization equals 85 percent.

Those figures show that productive capacity is well utilized and that major industries are successful and have a future. Students of small and medium-size industries, however, end up with a different impression.

Al-Ja'fari said that the Gulf region has embarked on an era that requires the cooperation of all sectors involved with industry and their concerted effort to support Gulf industrialists and help them produce products that will be competitive at home and abroad.

He called upon the departments of industry in the various ministries and government agencies to review their past role in issuing industrial licenses and permits and scrutinizing feasibility studies. They should expand their function and offer technical advice in cooperation with the administrations of industrial cities in order to elevate factory production management, develop operating methods, and raise productivity levels.

The secretary general of Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting said that the call to protect domestic industry will not in itself guarantee realization of hopes for Gulf industry to advance to the head of international industry and become competitive worldwide. This, as he put it, will require making quality the fundamental objective of Gulf industrialists. He pointed out that several Gulf industries are on a par with their best international counterparts, but others still lag far behind and need help and assistance.

Al-Ja'fari emphasized that industry must employ modern management techniques in order to rationalize material and human resources within a distinguished productive framework and therefore achieve high productivity. He added that rational thinking to identify production goals will ensure optimum solutions that involve the least risk.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### 'Arafat To Meet With Territories Leaders 'Soon'

93P50085A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
1 Mar 93 p 3

[Text] Informed Palestinian sources have told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat will soon meet with Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories to discuss the results of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's tour and his meetings in the occupied territories.

The sources thought it likely that the Palestinian meeting would be held in Tunis, where the PLO is headquartered, and indicated that the meeting would focus on discussing the leaders' report on their meeting with Christopher, which they prepared before the end of his first tour of the Middle East.

The sources noted that this meeting aims to create a joint Palestinian strategic action plan, at both the Arab and international levels, between the leaders inside and outside of the occupied territories at this stage.

In a related item, the sources indicated that, after this, 'Arafat will continue his meetings with leaders from the Palestinian factions to discuss recent developments in light of this report. The meetings will focus on upcoming consultations between the PLO and Egypt at the political and senior diplomatic levels.

### Editorial: How To Unlink Deportees, Peace Talks

93AF0387A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 9 Feb 93 p 5

["News Analysis" column by Husayn Hijazi from Nicosia: "Now That Arafat Has Linked the Deportee Crisis to the Peace Talks, at What Price Unlinking?"]

[Text] Israeli leader Yitzhaq Rabin wagered that the settlement he had reached with the American administration in the case of the deportees would be sufficient to extricate him from it. Rabin thought, for his part, that this "compromise" might be interpreted that he had retreated without raising the flag of surrender. As far as Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat is concerned, perhaps now the early goals, such as the search for a face-saving way out, may be planned, and the Palestinian leader is trying to broaden these political goals more ambitiously, hoping to get out of this battle with the biggest possible political price.

Thus we may see the mounting luck raising the price and the hard line 'Arafat has pursued since the early days of the crisis. He understood, with his political intuition, that this was a matter of the rare mistakes and opportunities an enemy offers and that with a little finesse and persistence, a victory might be achieved in a battle that, from all sides, seemed easy and not very strenuous. The base on which he relied in managing this crisis was very simple and yet very shrewd: He established a certain linkage between the crisis of the deportees and the fate of the peace process as a whole.

By linking an emergency crisis and a larger process like the negotiations, as Henry Kissinger used to like to do in managing negotiations, he did not want to put his adversary in the corner at the beginning, by pressuring an accord on the latter without exerting much effort to set it up. However, in a way that did not diminish his brilliance in bringing about the maneuver, he prepared conditions conducive to forcing his enemy to retreat from this crisis, retreat being its sole option, and leaving the key to this game in his own hand. He will now try to use it to up the price of the great barter in exchange for his stand in easing the solution of the small crisis.

The new balance, then, may be summarized as follows: Rabin grudgingly agreed to give in, in this case, to the American administration in order to ease America's task of dismantling the alliance pressuring Israel, and 'Arafat is demanding that the U.S. administration advance him a similar price in return for his canceling his veto over the efforts of new U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to put an end to this affair and circle the wagons anew to resume the negotiations.

In other words, Rabin and 'Arafat both want to give the United States this round to put an end to the crisis. But while Rabin prefers to pay the price to the American administration, 'Arafat thinks this price should be transferred eventually to his account, in view of the fact that he was the one who had the goods. But is this deal possible from the practical standpoint?



To answer this question, we must weigh two major factors: First, what sort of price does 'Arafat want in return for Rabin's facilitating a compromise? Second, how ready is the other side to agree to pay this price? Are there other options and ways out, other than this haggling?

Regarding the price, it might be said that 'Arafat wants to be recognized as one of the major axes of the negotiations and that this goal was his reason for freezing progress in the phased talks in the recent rounds of negotiations, as a kind of trade-off in understanding in this phase by acknowledging the public role of the PLO. 'Arafat now thinks that the deportees' crisis will contribute to the improvement of his maneuver of his, and its chances of success, after having been content with playing only the hard-line card around the table. But to what extent can the Israelis and Americans accept this price, which involves changing the Madrid formula? This does not depend on its ability to encircle the Palestinian president's maneuver, but, first and last, on creating an alternative to the price.

In this sense, Washington may, in the end, be able to weaken 'Arafat's bargaining by solving the deportee crisis: by pressuring Israel to retreat one more step, which would be interpreted as satisfying International Security Council Resolution 799, thus taking the banishment card out of 'Arafat's hand. The U.S. administration could also exploit the rift and growing fragmentation in the positions of the Arab participants in the talks, who refuse to play on the Palestinian president's field—with his having linked the bilateral negotiations and the crisis of the deportees—by isolating 'Arafat instead of playing his game, especially if holding the talks were to be accompanied by an attempt on Rabin's part to achieve a split in either the Syrian or Jordanian front. This might be seen as weakening Palestinian diplomacy.

The weak point in this game, however, is not the fact that it is hard to go to the talks without the Palestinians, but the fact that with this option, feasibly and realistically, if they do not want to give 'Arafat a "carrot" to solve the crisis of the deportees, they will give the reward to Hamas. But more importantly, if the PLO were out of the game, its ability to secure cover for the Palestinian negotiating team would be weakened. Could a Palestinian side be found that could negotiate, whether the PLO facilitates its alliance with Hamas, or weakens it? Is this balance an element of stability, or the fastest way to confuse things? Are the Palestinians the only losing side if this should happen, or only one of several losers?

This is the question posed in the end. The wisdom that says that it is possible to reach a stage where the talks and the PLO can be separated does not mean the negotiations are a failure. But first this separation could be the healing balm to cure the PLO of some of its enduring illusions, with the possibility of America's consent to get it into the game. Here one must wonder whether the rapprochement that has started between the Palestinian mainstream and Hamas against the backdrop of the

deportees and 'Arafat's going to Iraq, amending his progress to a crescent that stretches from Tripoli to Baghdad, represents some change in the Palestinian president's options.

#### Arab League Reports 4,000 Detainees

93P50051A

[Editorial Report] London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic on 5 February 1993 on page 3 carries highlights of a report by the Arab League's General Administration for Palestinian Affairs. The article quotes figures from the report saying that there are 4,000 Palestinian detainees distributed over 40 prisons and detention centers. It counts "1,032 dead and 1,021 wounded," but does not mention a time frame for these figures. The article also cites the following figures from the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories: 500 Palestinian detainees subjected to torture by the Mosad and 25,000 Palestinians arrested during the past year.

#### Records, Cash Stolen From Fatah Offices

93P50059A Doha AL-SHARQ in Arabic 9 Feb 93 p 7

[Text] Amman, AL-SHARQ exclusive—Fatah Movement property in Jordan has been subjected to a strange incident of theft. The office of the movement's Financial Administration in Amman was broken into last Saturday night [6 Feb], when unidentified persons used explosive charges to break open the vault in which cash was kept and steal its contents. The thieves also stole all of the administration's private accounting records. This means that the administration will be unable to call in the debts owed by many who were given advances. AL-SHARQ sources affirmed that those who carried out the operation must be responsible cadres in the Fatah Movement who were able to get through the movement's security barriers in one way or another.

#### London Arab Press Analyzes New DFLP Party

##### Effects on Violence, Factionalism

93AE0329A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 5 Feb 93 p 6

[Article by Rub'i al-Madhun: "Democratic Union Is New Palestinian Party With One Side for Political Action and Other Side for Armed Action"]

[Text] Nicosia—Amidst a high wave of armed and "security" escalation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Zuhayrah Kamal, a member of the Palestinian delegation to the negotiations, announced creation of preparatory committees to pave the way for establishing the Palestinian Democratic Union Party, called Fida' for short. This direct announcement is considered the first act of defiance by the party's preparatory committee against the Israeli occupation authorities and an attempt by the committee to, first, test the level of the Israeli

reaction to this step and, secondly, to make the party action's "legitimacy" a fait accompli.

The proclamation of Fida' from Jerusalem signifies several things, the most important of which is the emphasis on the fact that the party was founded in the occupied territories. The party will have its leadership offices in the occupied territories, while maintaining extension offices in the direction of the dispersed Palestinians, including, according to reliable information, the organizations and elements that broke away from the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] sometime ago and became known as the "renewal wing" that is led by Yasir 'Abdrabbuh, head of the PLO Information Department.

As of the first moment, this sudden development has raised several questions as to whether a new party organization can rise to the challenge and open a path for itself amidst the existing "factional" logjam, whether its success will reaffirm its past extensions, or whether it will constitute the first attempt to rebel against all three ideological, political, and organizational levels of the "factional system."

According to its draft political program and its constitution, the party relies on a new concept of action that differs from the prevalent principles for founding party organizations. Immediately and without reluctance, this party has dropped the conventional ideological support of the leftist organizations that produced the founders and that have always been "vanguard" and "revolutionary" organizations that rely on "revolutionary theory." Its membership system does not require any specific ideological commitments or specific intellectual convictions. The party is content with its members' adherence to its political objectives and program. This program seeks to "end the occupation, achieve the right to repatriation in accordance with the UN resolutions, defend the social and democratic interests of the various factions of the people, and involve the masses in criticizing and correcting the national course and in developing the intifadah."

Whereas the Fida' plan has emphasized the "right to use all means of struggle to expel the occupation," it has also underlined the "intifadah action and popular struggle" in more than one place and context, asserting that they "are not in conflict with the other forms of struggle." But the party has not embraced armed action directly or implicitly in a way that would certainly impede its "gaining" the legitimacy of open action. Perhaps this tendency reflects an early endeavor to adapt to the coming phase of Palestinian struggle. This phase could see changes in the general conditions that will open the door for the rise of political parties in a not unlikely phase of transfer of authority, despite the complications facing the peace process currently.

This approach harbors the possibility that the [party] founders will break away from the strain and burdens of the past partisan legacies and will move to expand the

channels of popular absorption and polarization to include broad and varied social groups.

But the contents of the announcement made by Zuhayrah Kamal and of the new Palestinian party's program continue to be the object of examination, questions, and debate, all of which could expand at a future phase, especially questions concerning Fida's place in the PLO, its connection with the PLO's political program, and the way in which it will be represented in the PLO institutions. In this regard, sources close to the preparatory committee have assured AL-HAYAH that the party they seek to establish in the near future "is a faction of the PLO and an heir to the DFLP's role and will be represented (in the future) in the PLO Executive Committee by Yasir 'Abdrabbuh."

With these ideas, bestowing the power of representation upon Yasir 'Abdrabbuh means, realistically, the liquidation of two legacies to which the "renewalists" have been tied:

First, the legacy of the name: The "renewal tendency" has not abandoned this name. But the first step in this direction is now being made. The renewalists' plan considers the new party a "development of the DFLP." It is not a facade for the DFLP, but a new party in which the DFLP constitutes a main element." Thus, the founders open the front door for them [DFLP followers], as well as other democrats, to join Fida' while leaving the back door ajar to facilitate the departure of their last ties and relations with the DFLP, along with the name, which will dissolve with the organization's other elements.

Second, a final admission that since the preparatory committees were announced, the DFLP has come to signify what it has actually signified throughout 24 years, namely a leftist faction led by Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah.

Politically, Fida's program is largely similar to the PLO program and Fida's policies are considered to be closer to the PLO's central tendency, led by Fatah. It—the party—is a "partner in the peace negotiations." This is concluded from the party's platform. The announcement on the party's preparatory committees was made by Zuhayrah Kamal, who is a member of the delegation to the negotiations. In addition to Kamal, the party includes others who have taken part in some negotiating rounds and who hold positions in the party's primary preparatory committee, including Sami Kaylani, Sam'an Khuri, Nazmi al-Ju'bah, Walid Zaqt, and Siham al-Barghuthi. These are the latest names announced to date in the party's preliminary preparatory structures.

If we are to conclude from these beginnings what the new endeavor entails in an arena swarming with political attempts, contradictions, and intricacies, then we will begin where we should have concluded, i.e. with questions concerning the slogans raised by the founders: A new party against the "bureaucratization of the intifadah and the institutions" and a party that launches war on

the negatives and puts the emphasis on strengthening democracy. How will the founders deal with these three dilemmas and with what language will they interpret them? If the "new is born of the womb of the old and carries some of its qualities," then what old qualities are going to be transmitted by advocates of the party in the new phase at a time when their new will be tested as never before? Will they be an extension of the "factional system," with its well-known traditions, or will they represent a rebellion against this system?

#### Differences With Hawatimah

93AE0329B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
5 Feb 93 p 3

[News Analysis by Arab Studies Center: "On Basis That Negotiations Complement Struggle, 'Abdrabbuh Settles Dispute With Hawatimah Over Name and Forms Political Party in Preparation for Coming Phase"]

[Text] London—An important political step has been accomplished in the occupied territories with the announcement made by the DFLP—PLO Executive Committee Member Yasir 'Abdrabbuh's wing—dissolving itself and replacing its organization by a new organization which has called itself the Fida'.

A statement issued in this regard says that this organization seeks, along with all the national forces, to develop the national and popular struggle role in order to end the occupation and achieve independence and repatriation. This party considers the negotiations an arena for struggle that complements the other arenas and supports the popular intifadah [uprising].

What is important about this development is that it is tantamount to a step toward putting an end to a bitter conflict between the two DFLP wings: The Nayif Hawatimah-led wing and the Yasir 'Abdrabbuh-led wing. But it is noticed in this regard that the statement announcing Fida' stresses that the DFLP in the diaspora, i.e., outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, will continue to be the DFLP.

It is well known that the DFLP, which itself had broken away from the PFLP in 1969, began to experience internal polarization after its departure from Beirut in wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion. Two years ago, the DFLP went through a split which produced two factions carrying the same name. Nayif Hawatimah continued to be secretary general of one faction and PLO Executive Committee Member Yasir 'Abdrabbuh became secretary general of the second faction.

In the past two years, the two factions have engaged in violent confrontations and have exchanged harsh accusations. Even though no armed battles have broken out between them, perhaps due to reasons dictated by the nature of the phase prevailing since the departure from Lebanon, some reports circulated in Tunis nearly a year ago told of how Nayif Hawatimah tried repeatedly to

have 'Abdrabbuh, his comrade and former deputy, assassinated. But those attempts failed.

Because the financial issues that are still pending between the two sides have been one of the reasons for the two factions' clinging to the name of DFLP, it is definite that this name will be maintained for the diaspora organization of the 'Abdrabbuh faction, which will be transformed [at home] into Fida' on 20 February. This fact falls within the context of the pending financial dispute.

'Abdrabbuh has sought and he continues to seek to share the funds the DFLP had before the split, estimated by some people at \$500 million, with Nayif Hawatimah. But the latter has rejected the principle of sharing in part and parcel.

It is worth noting that this issue and the issue of who holds the DFLP seat in the Executive Committee were raised violently in the latest PNC [Palestine National Council] session that convened in Tunis at the end of 1991. Even though the representation problem was solved by accrediting a representative for each wing of the organization, the funds problem has continued to be pending.

Perhaps what motivated the DFLP—the 'Abdrabbuh wing—to take the step of announcing Fida' in the occupied territories is the feeling that the hour has approached and that the nature of the coming phase dictates replacing this faction with a political party that Israel cannot object to and that can play a major role in political life and in the expected election processes.

It seems that 'Abdrabbuh, who considers himself the new party's actual leader and who belongs to the dovish tendency of the PLO leadership, has developed the conviction that armed factions are no longer appropriate and that the initiative must be taken to form a political party that adheres to peaceful means in its activity in the occupied territories.

The Nayif Hawatimah wing has accused Yasir 'Abdrabbuh and his faction of abandoning the armed struggle and succumbing to the "U.S. and Israeli wish" to defang the PLO and transform it into just a propaganda and political organization.

Before taking this step, the 'Abdrabbuh faction tried throughout the past two years to abandon this name to the other faction and to establish a unified party in the occupied territories by merging with the Palestinian Communist Party, which changed its name and became the Palestinian People's Party. But these endeavors failed.

Within the same context, the DFLP—'Abdrabbuh wing—has disbanded its organization in Jordan and turned it into a Jordanian party that has no organizational connection with the PLO and its factions. This party has acquired a permit from the Jordanian Interior Ministry to operate openly.



The statement announcing creation of Fida' contains a paragraph that states that the "DFLP in the occupied territories is the circle that has taken the initiative to establish this party through contacts with a large number of national notables and groups."

The said statement cites 11 points that it says constitute this party's main objectives, including support for and participation in political negotiations.

#### Upcoming DUP Conference Worries PLO

93P50058A Doha AL-SHARQ in Arabic 9 Feb 93 p 7

[Text] Amman, AL-SHARQ exclusive—AL-SHARQ has obtained documents belonging to the Palestinian Democratic Union Party [DUP] announcing the party's recent formation—rising from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 'Abd-Rabbuh faction and leaders of the Palestinian Communist Party [as published]—in the occupied territories.

According to these documents, the party will hold its constituent conference in Jerusalem at the end of this month. Elections for the chairman, treasurer, and media spokesman will be held, as well as ratification of the party's political platform and its founding communique. AL-SHARQ's sources affirm that the party will invite all of the political forces in Israel and the members of the Israeli Knesset to attend the conference. 'Abd-Rabbuh's measure prompted PLO leadership fears that this party might turn into an alternative to the national working committees that Dr. Sari Nusaybah formed after the peace negotiations began in Madrid at the end of 1991.

The party documents affirm the need to review the national working committees' working methods and note that Nusaybah had formed the national working committees because of the PLO's need to create support in the occupied territories for the peace negotiations. In its documents, the DUP did not dismiss the possibility of becoming an alternative to the working committees in the future. This alarmed the PLO leadership, which feels that its stances and strength have diminished since the start of the peace negotiations. What worried the PLO leadership even more is information that indicates that Palestinian delegation chairman Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi might chair this open union, since the DUP documents focus on the need for members of its provisional secretariat to have popular credibility and influence with the citizens of the occupied territories.

It is not yet known what impact this union will have on the intifadah's unified leadership, which follows a secretive work style at a time when the DUP leadership is calling for overt activity and saying that the negotiations phase is more favorable to open activity.

## BAHRAIN

### Gulf Institute To Invest in Auto Frame Making

93AE0269A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
8 Jan 93 p 10

[Article by Khalil Ni'mat]

[Text] The Gulf Investment Organization has decided to establish a large auto frame making project in Bahrain this year. The project is expected to cost \$30 to \$35 million.

Jasim al-Mana'i, executive vice president of the Gulf Investment Organization, announced this news. He said that this project would be implemented in the near future because the final evaluation study proved the possibility of the success of such a project, which would use aluminum manufactured in Bahrain as raw material. He added that the shareholders will hold a meeting soon to fix dates for both the company registration and announcement, as well as the project's starting date. Four companies will be investing in the new company, these are the Gulf Investment Organization, the Bahrain Company for Processing Aluminum, the al-Zamil Group of Companies and Factories, and a Korean company (Buri). Al-Mana'i added that each of the four companies will have equal shares, that is, 25 percent of the total capital.

Al-Mana'i said that by investing in this project, the Gulf Investment Organization's total investment in Bahrain will exceed \$1 billion. These investments have been provided either by arranging the necessary financing for certain projects or through direct investment in them.

Al-Mana'i declared that among the projects that the organization was either arranging financing for or acquiring are \$560 million loan for the Bahrain Aluminum Company (Alba); full acquisition of the Gulf International Bank, for \$450 million; and \$16 million for the aluminum casting project expansion. In addition, the Gulf Investment Organization provided either loans or financing for the Gulf Airline Company and the auto frame project. Al-Mana'i also stated that the Gulf Investment Organization's total investment in projects in the different Gulf Cooperation Council states amounted to \$2.5 billion by the end of 1992. Bahrain was at the top of those countries that received financing and investments from the Gulf Investment Organization. Saudi Arabia was second on the list. Al-Mana'i also indicated that the organization was presently studying the possibility of executing various important and profitable projects in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.

### Rise in Real Estate Transactions Registered

93AE0269B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
11 Jan 93 p 10

[Article by Khalil Ni'mat]

[Text] Real estate sources in Bahrain said that for the first time real estate transactions had flourished in that country. There was a substantial increase in the value of real estate transactions registered with the Real Estate Registration Administration in the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs last year. This value amounted to 109,670,425 Bahraini dinars, up from 81,494,393 dinars in 1991.

Shaykh Salman Bin-'Abdallah Al Khalifa, assistant under secretary for real estate registration and documentation at the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, said that December 1992 was the best month for real estate sales during that year, as the value of sales amounted to 13,092,519 dinars.

Shaykh Salman Al Khalifa added that the 9,800 real estate units traded last year represented a big increase over the 7,988 traded the previous year.

Shaykh Salman indicated that the sale of real estate units in 1992 and 1991 amounted to 5,082 and 2,842, respectively. He emphasized that since the end of the incidents that occurred in the region, the real estate market in Bahrain had been restored to normal, a fact that is verified by data. This normality applied to differences in both numbers and value of real estate.

'Abdallah Buhindi, a Bahraini businessman, mentioned that the United Real Estate Company, which was recently established with an authorized capital of 50 million and a paid capital of 10 million Bahraini dinars, will contribute to the promotion of the real estate sector and provide job opportunities for Bahrainis. This was the first real estate company to be established in Bahrain. Buhindi said that this company will provide businessmen with modern residential and commercial units. He further indicated that the company has requested that its founding committee prepare a project economic evaluation study. Subsequently, the committee assigned this study to an accounting firm. The committee will also prepare a study on future steps for the company. The company, therefore, will send special invitations to those who would like to invest in it. Those interested in investing will be required to send in their agreement along with 1 percent of the subscription value. The evaluation is expected to be completed in four to five weeks. Subsequently, the founding committee will be invited to convene in order to discuss a draft of the company's principle regulations, as well as the economic evaluation.

Buhindi further indicated to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that investors had previously supported the idea of establishing a real estate company.

Replying to a question about prospects of investment in this sector, Buhindi said: "I believe that this sector represents an average type of investment. Bahrain needs such a company because real estate activity is presently confined to small private companies that cannot handle

the building of large residential and commercial complexes." He also said that this company would prove to be a worthwhile one in the long run.

Burundi said: "Judging from my experience in this field, I believe that the return from this project will be good for investors because of Bahrain's limited area. This statement is specially true in light of Bahrain's attempt to develop all of its economic and commercial sectors. I also believe that if the management of the company is to experts and professionals in this field, it will achieve significant success for both investors and clients."

## IRAQ

### Saddam Husayn Meets With Turkish Personalities

93AE0293A Baghdad ALIF BA' in Arabic 30 Dec 92  
pp 4, 5

[Article: "In Press Interview, President Affirms: 'We Care for Our People as We Care for the Water in Our Brooks—or More'"]

[Text] Just when we had finished preparing the file of the events of 1992, and the magazine was going to press, the latest remarks of President Commander Saddam Husayn in an press interview conducted by Bulent Ecevit (president of Turkish Democratic Left Party) and Derya Sazak, editor in chief of the Turkish newspaper MIL-LIYET, with the president commander, may God preserve and protect him, were published on Sunday. Of course, ALIF BA' had to print a few paragraphs of this interview, which took place on 19 December.

In the interview, the president commander asserted the depth of his, and our wise leadership's, concern about our people in the north and about claims of possible emigration from Iraq if the foreign forces do not withdraw. The president said:

"If any Iraqi Kurd were to flee abroad, we do not think that this flight represents any desire to settle permanently in Turkey or Iran. Also, this assumption is meant to harm Iraq, and it is an assumption based on the false claim that there are other parties who are looking after the Kurds better than the Iraqi leadership is doing with its Kurds and its people. Every fair-minded person knows that the Kurds in the north are our people and that we care about them, their lives, their security, their standard of living, and their stability. So when we say that northern Iraq needs for the government, and not foreign parties, to provide the rule of law and security there, we mean that we are ensuring security, stability, and life for our people, without them being compelled to emigrate."

On the continued presence of foreign troops on Turkish soil, the exploitation of this situation on the part of the 30 aggressive nations to pressure Iraq, and the effect on

Turkey, the president commander said: "Turkey's economic and security situation and the psychological state of the people were better before the presence of the foreign troops on their soil than they are now." He added: "We think that Turkey's situation will get better, because we gauge the effect on the basis of the good effect in terms of morale, not on the basis of bad or forbidden or deviant conduct."

"We do not even see the influence of America itself in the world as being better now than it was before the aggression. Perhaps there are some who are even more afraid of America now, but on the other hand there are those who do not fear America any more—even among those who were in dread of America before the aggression. So if this is the situation of America, which itself led the whole operation, what does Turkey have to gain?"

In response to Bulent Ecevit's question about the existence of some kind of planning and arrangements to preempt a new mass flight if the allied forces did not withdraw from Turkey, the president commander said: "No one makes his people a promise about a foreign situation."

He added: "Iraq is an independent country, devoted to its people, and therefore you see that the leadership in Iraq has issued an amnesty, even for criminals, to encourage them to return to their country. In one year, numerous proclamations for blanket amnesty were made for those kind. These amnesty proclamations were not only for Kurds, but for all Iraqis, whether from southern, central, or northern Iraq. We care for our people as we care for the water in our brooks—or more."

Regarding Ecevit's question about the Palestine question and Iraq's role and action as far as obtaining a solution that will lead to the Palestinians' satisfaction with their future, the president commander said: "I would like to say that the actions of the United States so far in this regard have been tactical—not judging matters on the basis of Palestinian rights."

He added: "Our view is as follows: We must have the objective circumstances appropriate for the people of Palestine to directly express their rights through their legitimate representatives. In whatever they reject or accept, the world must respect free Palestinian will. Apart from the Iraqi view of this or that formula, Iraq will respect the will of the people of Palestine in this manner when they accept or reject any formula."

#### **Human Rights Advocate Condemns Embargo**

93AF0300A Baghdad ALIF BA' in Arabic 16 Dec 92  
p 12

[Interview with Professor Ibrahim al-Shariqi, by Isma'il 'Isa; place and date not given: "We Aim for Iraq's Voice To Reach the Heart of Europe"]

[Text] Professor Ibrahim al-Shariqi is a very well-known figure in the field of human rights and independence. He is a member of many European and Asian academic societies. He is also a lecturer and visiting professor at many European universities. Recently, he visited a number of officials in Iraq to coordinate the task of preparing a comprehensive file about the claims of the Iraqi people. This file will be submitted to the appropriate courts in Europe.

In a special interview with al-Shariqi, we talked about the contents of the Iraqi file, including the U.S. violations of the Geneva convention, human rights, freedom, and self determination.

['Isa] As a well-known figure in human rights, what are your remarks about the clear violations of the human rights and the freedom of the people?

[Al-Shariqi] We all know that man is born free to live free. The calls of the philosophers to emancipate man and grant him his natural and political rights started during the 18th century. The Greek philosopher, Plato, pioneered 500 years B.C., the liberation from legends and myths, feudalism, and tyranny. We also have the 1948 UN Treaty of Human Rights. I personally participated in wording its articles that deal with basic human rights. Today, the Third World countries are suffering from very rigid regimes. There is no freedom of speech or free elections of their representatives. In these countries where the people have no freedom, there are groups of intellectuals who contact international organizations in Western Europe concerned with defending human rights in order to pressure the governments to ease their restrictions and give their people their freedom. I came to Iraq to undertake a study of the situation. Three months ago, I visited Iraq and met with a number of people and presented them with a study of Iraq as it is perceived in the world. I asked them to concentrate on the international media because without it, it would be impossible to persuade international public opinion to favor Iraq. We concentrated our efforts on the human rights organizations to present the true picture of Iraq and its sufferings because the embargo of 1990 is unjust and we have to break it. The decision of the American administration was not aimed at liberating Kuwait but rather at destroying Iraq. This decision was actually taken in 1989. It is a well-known fact that Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney and National Security Adviser Scroft are strong enemies of Iraq and the Arabs. They were planning to attack Iraq and used the Kuwait incident as a pretext.

#### **Direct Contacts With Major Countries**

[Al-Shariqi] They wanted a new government in Iraq that is subservient to the American authority, as the case is in the Gulf countries. They wanted the embargo to continue to keep the Iraqi people hungry. The Iraqi people are known for their patriotism, strong will, courage, and ability to live through difficulties. President Saddam Husayn is very well liked. Jacques Chirac told me that



about Saddam Husayn. President Saddam Husayn is an international figure, and he is indeed great. Without him, Iraq would be destroyed. Thus, we must have direct contact with the major countries and bypass the United Nations. We cannot depend on the Security Council to break the embargo. It might remain for 10 years because America dominates the Security Council and wants the embargo to remain.

#### The Rights of the Attacked Iraqi People

Al-Shariqi opened a file with a cover that reads: "The Rights of the Attacked Iraqi People." This file includes seven points that the professor explains by saying:

- "This file will be submitted to the highest courts in Paris, Geneva, Stockholm, and The Hague to defend the human rights of the Iraqi people who are suffering from the embargo."
- "The claims will be submitted by three international organizations."
- "The plaintiff is the Arab nation and the Iraqi people."
- "The defendants are the governments of George Bush, John Major, and Francois Mitterand."
- "These claims attempt to prove the rights of the Iraqi people, who were maliciously attacked, and to break the embargo."
- "To win our case, we have to mobilize public opinion in the European Community through contacts with newspapers, humane societies, and political and legal personalities. We must hold seminars and deliver speeches at universities and cultural centers. This link is missing, because there are no current contacts."
- "Paying no attention to the Security Council and its staff. Its resolutions are illegal, and they are issued because of American pressure. These resolutions will only be revoked by means of pressure from international public opinion on the major countries."

#### Bright Face of Iraq

[Isa] Through these efforts, you are trying to open the file on the rights of the Iraqi people. What will it take to urge other international organizations that defend human rights to break the unjust embargo on the Iraqi people, particularly because there are accusations against the United States in this file.

[Al-Shariqi] This is a very important question. International humanitarian organizations believe that Iraq is suffering from injustice, embargo, and aggression because of the mechanism of military destruction used by the United States against Iraq. This mechanism is legally banned and carries the death penalty. The German Nazis in World War II did the same thing in many countries. As a result, the Nuremberg Court issued the death penalties. Since 1946, there has been a norm that is applied to war criminals who attack public buildings. The Americans bombed Iraq for 42 days.

The file will be distributed among many human rights groups that we will ask to present Iraq's proper image. At

the international courts, I will be accompanied by four Iraqi representatives who will represent the Iraqi people in these claims.

[Isa] The embargo is a violation of the Geneva conventions, including the right to life and self-determination. What is your comment and analysis of this topic?

[Al-Shariqi] When the Bill of Human Rights was adopted in 1948 and also its addenda in 1973, it called for helping the people fight aggression, injustice, and poverty. Europe has the idea that Iraq is a very wealthy country, that its people are very strong, and that it was the Iraqis who started the confrontation. Thus there is no serious attention given to the American violations against Iraq. In order to counter the American policy, we started our contacts with major political and legal personalities in Western Europe. Then we went to the four international courts in The Hague, Paris, Stockholm, and Geneva to start our legal actions against Bush, Major, and Mitterand and the rest of the countries who participated in the aggression against Iraq.

#### Sudan's News Agency Head Wants Embargo Broken

93AE0307A Baghdad ALIF BA' in Arabic 6 Jan 93 p 7

[Interview with al-Tayyib Mustafa, general manager of the Sudan News Agency, in Iraq; date not given: "General Manager of Sudan News Agency Tells ALIF BA': 'Iraq and Sudan Are in Same Foxhole'"]

[Text] Al-Tayyib Mustafa, general manager of Sudan News Agency [SUNA], visited Iraq this week. He signed a joint communique with 'Adnan al-Jaburi, general manager of the Iraq News Agency, to reinforce the cooperation between the two news agencies for the purpose of shoring up the dedicated media and bringing about a deeper understanding of activist concepts and national bonds between the people of the Arab nation, a nation that is facing a Zionist, imperialist, colonialist conspiracy.

ALIF BA' spent some time with al-Tayyib Mustafa to record his feelings and opinions about many current national and pan-Arab issues.

The general manager of SUNA started out by saying: "Sometimes a person cannot express what he feels in his heart. Other times, words and language fall short of conveying the meaning of what one feels in one's heart. This is why I really cannot say more than that I appreciate, in every sense of that word, what this great country and its generous people have done. I have a great deal of affection and regard for the triumphant commander, President Saddam Husayn."

[ALIF BA'] How do you assess Iraq's stance in the face of challenges?

[Mustafa] We in Sudan think that no other country now is as close to us as Iraq is. To us, no other country but

Iraq represents Arab pride under the new world order, over which America prevails. We are pursuing the same path, and we are being subjected to the same sanctions and the same problems and harassment to which the high-minded and proud Iraq is being subjected. Thus, we are in the same foxhole, and we are facing the same fate. I am saying that we really appreciate the role that Iraq is playing. We will continue to hold on to our principles, regardless of what it costs us, because we are people of principle and not people who are after quick and material interests.

[ALIF BA'] In your capacity as a media official, what is your view of the media siege to which Iraq is being subjected?

[Mustafa] The embargo that has been imposed on us is multifaceted. It is well-known that the media represent one significant and formidable facet of that embargo. We in the media have to do everything we can to coordinate our actions and cooperate with each other to break this embargo that is being imposed on us by Western media agencies. We have to do everything we can to put into action a plan that can be carried out and can move us in that direction. Reinforcing the technical, engineering, and editorial aspects of our media may be the first step we need to take to stand up to all of the attempts that are being made to obliterate our identity and block our progress. That is why we will work hard to remove from the media all of the distortions against the people of Iraq that we can remove. [end Mustafa]

Al-Tayyib Mustafa spoke about the ongoing reconstruction effort in Iraq, and he expressed his strong admiration for it. He said: "What I saw in Iraq is inimitable. Those who speak about Japanese and German miracles do so because they have not seen the Iraqi miracle. If they were to see what is happening in Iraq, they would say that it was a miracle that will not be repeated. The fact that the Saddam River was completed in record time is quite disturbing for the West. After all that it has gone through, Iraq has a connection once again with leadership and civilization, and it was its history that gave shape to the Arab character. That is why a large part of what has been accomplished is a product of Iraq's cumulative civilization throughout the ages."

[ALIF BA'] How would you describe the results of your visit to Iraq?

[Mustafa] This visit has left a deep impression on me and intensified my feelings for Iraq, a country that has a permanent position in our hearts. The visit was successful and fruitful, and it gave new impetus to the future of fraternal relations between the news agencies of the two fraternal countries. In this regard an agreement on cooperation has been signed. It is a small achievement that only represents our intentions. But we must move beyond this agreement, and we must develop it continuously and stretch its parameters. We did that in the course of my meeting with Mr Muhammad Hamzah al-Zubaydi, the prime minister. Al-Zubaydi assured me

that we had to do what we could to make the slogans of unity a visible reality. After all, the feelings that officials in both countries have for each other have not been stained by anything. That is why we have to move these close relations forward, and we have to overcome all the barriers in the context of joint Arab action.

#### **Inspectors Confiscate Gold From Merchants**

93AE0309A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic  
9 Jan 93 p 8

[Article by Sa'di al-Sab': "Many Violations Cited in Inspection Campaigns Carried Out by Weights and Measures and Quality Control Agencies; Deceit and Fraud Noted in 12 Goldsmiths' Stores in Baghdad"]

[Text] Ever since starting its inspection campaign, the Weights and Measurements Department, which is affiliated with the Central Agency for Weights and Measures and Quality Control, has cited agents and owners of commercial and industrial establishments, as well as cooperative societies and gas stations, with several violations and irregularities for using weights and measures that did not meet the required specifications. An official source at the department told AL-JUMHURIYAH that 30 violations were cited in the inspection campaign, which was conducted in Baghdad in a total of 167 stores and commercial agencies. Owners of these establishments were using weights and measures that were not authentic, thereby infringing on citizens' rights. Those weights and measures were confiscated, and legal measures were taken against those who were using them.

The source stated that the fruit and vegetable markets were inspected in the areas of al-Dawrah, al-Saydiyah, al-I'lam, al-Tibb al-Baytari, al-Khadra', al-Shurtah, al-Jihad, al-Jami'ah, al-Ma'mun, and al-Dawudi, which is subordinate to the Cooperative Society for Marketing Agricultural Products in al-Karkh. The purpose of the inspection was to compare the weights and measures that were used there with Iraqi standard specifications. After the inspection was conducted and the comparison was made, several violations were found in some of these markets, where it was found that illegal weights (hexagonal) were being used. The weights were removed from the markets and confiscated, and the cooperative society's management was notified.

The source indicated that 92 gas stations underwent inspection in Baghdad. Six pumps were idled because they were found to be functioning improperly due to a variety of malfunctions. Furthermore, a violation was found in al-Kazimiyah gas station, where a test of one of its pumps showed that citizens were receiving less fuel than they wanted to purchase. Customers were unaware of this because the amount of gas that was pumped was not shown on the gas meter.

The official source indicated that the department had responded to an invitation from the Ministry of Trade to inspect the weights and measures that were being used by the General Company for Trade in Foodstuffs and its

branches in Baghdad, Karbala', al-Najaf, Babil, and al-Anbar. The ministry wanted these weights and measures tested so that a determination could be made about the extent to which they complied with standard specifications. The comparison showed that five out of the 15 weights belonging to the company that was inspected were rejected when they were found to be faulty. The official also indicated that industrial plants and silos were inspected to ascertain that the scales that were being used there by vehicles, trucks, and transport vehicles were operating properly. Central mixers in industrial and construction projects were also inspected for the purpose of making adjustments to them to determine how precise they were for operations. No violations to speak of were found in the course of inspecting this equipment.

The source revealed that the department had rejected 13 water meters that belong to a meter and gauge repair branch of the Baghdad Water and Sewer Department. These meters, which provided water to citizens, were rejected because they were not accurate. After 280 water meters were examined this month, 13 were found to be unsuitable for operations. AL-JUMHURIYAH showed the department's inspector the condition and size of bricks produced by some local brickyards so that compliance by the brickyards' owners with weights and measures could be determined. It was shown that while proper weights and measurements were used by the brickyards' owners, there was a tangible difference that one could sense when one knew how much the brick was supposed to weigh. It is the responsibility of the responsible agency in the Ministry of Trade to monitor this matter and take legal measures against violators.

The inspectors chose to convey through AL-JUMHURIYAH their proposal that the Ministry of Trade and their department form joint committees to conduct inspections of food-product agents and bakeries. Because their work and the ministry's work overlapped, cooperation in this area was necessary to ensure the rights of the citizens. They spoke of the role of people's councils and popular organizations, which, they said, should be more effective in monitoring, tracking, and exposing violators who openly take advantage of citizens.

The official source revealed that violations were found in 12 of the 56 goldsmiths' shops that were inspected in Baghdad. He pointed out that the violations involved the use of unstamped gold, the absence of a professional license among some of the goldsmiths, and the use by some of them of illegal weights and measurements that did not bear the official stamp. Jewelry was removed from these stores as a legal consequence of the store owners' violations.

AL-JUMHURIYAH asked another competent source in the department about the violations for which goldsmiths' shops were cited when the department conducted its inspections. The department source indicated that some goldsmiths were offering goldplated silver for

sale and claiming it was gold. In addition, jewelry had been tampered with. After the jewelry was stamped, parts of it were removed and replaced. In addition, deceitful and fraudulent methods were used by some locally owned workshops. Furthermore, the fact that some goldsmiths did not register pieces of gold in the special records suggests that the gold in question was brought into their stores improperly or that the failure to register the gold was one way that the goldsmiths could evade taxes. Because the gold in their shops is not registered, goldsmiths can then deny that the gold came from their shops. The source called upon the owners of goldsmith stores to verify the identity of sellers, as well as the composition, the quality, and the source of the gold that is being offered to them. They can thus ensure that they will have no problems that could result in their being questioned by legal authorities.

## JORDAN

### Land Income Up 28 Percent Last Year

93AE0243B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
11 Jan 93 p 10

[Article: "Land Revenues in Jordan Rise at Rate of 28 Percent"]

[Text] The Department of Acreage and Land Registry in Jordan stated that its revenues last year had risen at a rate of 28 percent and had exceeded 41 million dinars.

Last month's revenues had amounted to 4,647,216 dinars; a 4 percent increase over revenues in November, the preceding month, during which revenues amounted to 4,431,240 dinars.

Last month's revenues were 14 percent higher than revenues for the same month in 1991. Revenues [in December 1991] were 4,058,659 dinars.

The rise in the revenues of the Department of Acreage and Land Registry indicates concrete improvement in land sales in Jordan during the past year, particularly in light of the fact that large numbers of expatriates coming back from Iraq and Kuwait were eager to buy land for housing or for investment projects.

Land sales had been sluggish before the Gulf crisis, but the return of expatriates to the country energized the real estate industry, particularly the segment that deals with rental apartments. Rent rose by more than 200 percent.

A study on the development of employment activity in Jordan that was prepared by the general secretariat of the National Committee for Housing stated that compared to other private sector activities, the real estate industry had quite an extensive capacity to provide employment for Jordan's labor force.

The study showed that 4,677 workers are employed in those organizations that were covered by the study; 76 percent of those workers are male, and 24 percent are



female. Employed Jordanian women represented 22.6 percent of all employed appointees of all nationalities and 27 percent of all employed Jordanian appointees. Employed [male] Jordanian appointees represented 84 percent of all appointees, and employed [male] Egyptian appointees represented 14 percent of all appointees.

### Party Registrations, Tendencies Reported

93AE0162B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
26 Nov 92 p 2

[Article: "Muslim Brotherhood Forms Political Party; Unofficial Parties Strive for Legitimacy"]

[Text] Among the original scores of political parties that have been established in the past two years, only nine parties have submitted applications for permits to the Jordanian Interior Ministry since the House of Representatives formulated the 1992 Political Parties Law. The law was approved by royal decree, as well as by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The parties that have submitted applications for permits are:

- The Islamic Action Front: This is the Muslim Brotherhood's party. Many important Brotherhood figures belong to it, including four deputies and one senator, Ishaq al-Farhan, the front's interim secretary general and official spokesman. It is apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to benefit from the experience of the 1950's, when a decree was issued that dissolved all of the political parties that existed at that time. The Muslim Brotherhood continued to pursue its activities because the dissolution decree did not apply to them. The Muslim Brotherhood was not a political party, but was considered to be a charitable and religious association. At the same time, they have wanted to pursue a party role in Jordan. Therefore, they have formed the Islamic Action Front to act as a front through which they can operate freely.
- Two conservative parties submitted applications: the al-'Ahd [Covenant] Party, the secretary general of which is Engineer 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Majali, former director of Public Security; and the Party of the Future, whose most prominent leader is Deputy Sulayman 'Arar, former speaker of the House of Representatives. These two political parties focus on the Jordanian national identity.
- Three leftist parties: the Democratic Progressive Party, whose secretary general is 'Ali 'Amir; and the Jordanian Democratic People's Party, whose secretary general is Taysir al-Zibri. These two parties form the Jordanian wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is led by Nayif Hawatimah, who is of Jordanian origin. The third party is the center-left Jordanian National Alliance Party, whose secretary general is Mazin al-Sakit, a prominent national and nationalist figure.
- One nationalist party submitted an application for a permit, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. Its official spokesman is lawyer Ahmad al-Najdawi.

- For the communists, the Jordanian Communist Party submitted an application under a new name. Its secretary general is Ya'qub Zayadin, who was prominent in the 1950's.

Jordanian political parties have announced themselves in one way or another in recent years, either by issuing statements or participating in forums, sit-ins, and mass parades. This has all been unofficial, but the state has tolerated it as part of the climate of democracy in Jordan that has resulted from the return of parliamentary life to the country, after an absence of nearly 22 years.

A number of partisan politicians think that the scores of political parties that have declared themselves in the past are not all true political parties and that there are about 30 parties that are parties on paper only and do not have actual party components. Some of them will, ultimately, disappear, and others will merge into other parties. Moreover, small parties will automatically fade away.

Some parties face several problems in applying for an official permit. The most important problem is obtaining the names of 50 persons as founders of the party, in accordance with the stipulations of Jordanian law. The law also stipulates that the party rely on Jordanians citizen and Jordanian financial sources for financing. If it turns out that a party is receiving foreign support, the party's leader will be penalized by a two-year jail sentence or a fine of 2,000 Jordanian dinars or both.

Because a large number of Jordanian political parties were receiving financial support from abroad, these parties find themselves with a major problem if they must depend only on local financing. They are required to reveal to official quarters the names of their founders, their sources of financing, and how their funds are spent. The party must have well-known, public offices and publicly printed materials.

These matters, collectively, cause many politicians to think hard before applying for a party license.

A number of political parties went public during the recent Gulf crisis, when the position of most parties coincided with the official Jordanian position. Parties dared to declare themselves openly and participated in parades and demonstrations. They issued heated political statements, to such an extent that Jordanian citizens were completely surrounded by names of parties that they had never heard of before. Several partisan politicians thought this large number of political parties was strange, as well as the similarity in the names and ideological tendencies of these parties.

The political parties in Jordan compete with each other under four orientations:

- Religious: These parties include the Muslim Brotherhood; Islamic Action Party; Islamic Liberation Party; Islamic Jordanian Party; the Dar al-Koran Group; the

Liberation Party; the Democratic Arab Islamic Movement; Islamic Jihad; al-Da'wah wa al-Tabligh [Call and Revelation] Party; and the Alliance for Justice, Islamic Modernization, and the Oppressed.

- Nationalist: These parties include the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and its branches, Arab Unity, the Democratic National Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Jordanian Democratic Unionist Grouping, (the Sole Arab Movement), the Arab People's Liberation Movement, the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Popular Nationalist Movement, the Unionist Struggle, the Arab Vanguard, the Arab Unionist Alliance, and the Democratic Unionist Alliance.
- Leftist political parties include the Jordanian Communist Party, Democratic Popular Unity, Revolutionary Path, Communist Workers, Jordanian Democratic Party, Jordanian Progressive Party, Revolutionary Marxists, the Socialist Movement, Revolutionary People's Party, and the Democratic Action Party.
- Conservatives include al-'Ahd Party, the Party of the Future, al-Ummah, the Progress and Justice Party, the Jordanian National Party, the Free National Alliance, Awakening Party, al-Nahdah, Salvation Party, al-Ansar Party, Jordanian Social Democratic Party, Jordanian Reform Party, the New Arabs, the Constitutional Front, the Liberal Unionists, the Labor Party, and the Jordanian National Alliance.

#### Report Summarizes 1992 Loans, Remittances

93AE0284A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
29 Dec 92 p 10

[Report from Amman: "Jordanian Expatriates Remit \$1.3 Billion in 1992"]

[Text] Financial sources indicate that Jordanian expatriate remittances in 1992 amounted to some \$1.3 billion, of which \$700 million were remitted by Jordanians working abroad and the remainder was remitted by holders of savings abroad as a hedge against currency fluctuations in world markets.

The above figure does not take into account \$1.5 billion in financial aid deposited in Jordanian banks by those returning from the Gulf, including the value of automobiles and personal belongings they brought back with them into Jordan. A considerable portion of that amount has been used for building homes, purchasing land, and investing in some productive projects.

Financial sources forecasted that Jordanian workers abroad, especially those in Gulf Arab countries, will continue to transfer their savings to Jordan and said that those savings already exceed their levels in previous years and play an important role in funding imports and supporting the balance of payments. Jordan still suffers from a trade deficit because the value of imports in each of the past three years exceeds their value in 1988 and before.

Imports are valued at 1.72 billion dinars, while exports hover around 600 million dinars, which has resulted in a trade deficit of about 1 billion dinars.

Efforts are being made to reduce imports by rationalizing consumption with such means as the sales tax that will take effect on 1 April.

In another development, Mr. Hirakawa, resident director of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, said that Japan is now Jordan's largest source of aid, having extended \$1.3 billion in assistance and loans by the end of 1991.

In response to a question by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT on the rationale for the aid in view of the attendant external indebtedness, he said that the purpose of the loans is to support Jordan's self-help efforts and to fund certain development projects, especially those for infrastructure.

Half of the loans, offered at an annual interest rate of 2.9 percent over a term of 25 years with a seven-year grace period, are considered to be direct financial aid. That portion of the loans that may be used to import capital requirements is offered for a 30-year term at an annual rate of only 1 percent after a 10-year grace period. This means that 75 percent of all Japanese loans represent direct financial aid and may be used to purchase Japanese and non-Japanese goods.

#### Tax Law Opposition Forces House To Reconsider

93AE0284C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
25 Jan 93 p 13

[Report from Amman: "Opposition to Proposed Sales Tax Intensifies"]

[Text] Opposition to a law promulgating a sales tax recently intensified in Jordan after the [proposed] law was debated over the past three months by a committee that included influential economic figures.

The Federation of Chambers of Commerce recently held a meeting in the town of al-Tufaylah at which Federation Chairman Muhammad 'Asfur expressed opposition to the law. He even demanded that it be rescinded or at least postponed for the time being.

'Asfur believes that the economic reform process, which is primarily based on shrinking the budget deficit, should not be implemented by raising taxes on consumers but by reforming the entire tax system.

The 'Asfur viewpoint has so far been the most prevalent among the opposition and has prompted some analysts to say that that viewpoint may induce the government, which is still debating the law, to review it again before sending it to the parliament.

'Asfur calls for a more efficient tax levy and a better-performing tax system and for establishing trust between tax collectors and taxpayers.

Recently, some deputies informally questioned whether there is a need for a new tax law that does nothing but expand the list of taxable commodities.

Jordanian economists believe that current economic conditions are not receptive to the new tax law and that opposition to it may prompt a review of its draft.

An economist close to the government said, however, that abolishing that law now, after debating for all this time, is not in the cards, but it may be postponed until all parties reach final agreement on it.

There are indications within the "Jordanian economic house" that the commercial and industrial sectors differ on the law. Those in the commercial sector object to certain of its provisions. Some of them indeed oppose the law in its entirety. Industrialists, on the other hand, strongly support it and consider it a progressive and enlightened legislation in step with current conditions in Jordan.

Perhaps the most glaring difference between the two sectors is that the private sector calls for a 30 percent ceiling on the sales tax, whereas the industrial sector advocates a 50 percent tax in order to protect national industries.

Disagreement over the implementation schedule of the sales tax still dominates discussions. It is the view of the commercial sector that the tax be implemented in two stages in order to ward off disarray in commercial markets. The first stage is to commence immediately after the law is ratified, and the second is to begin seven years later. The industrial sector, on the other hand, believes that the tax should be implemented in three steps.

## LIBYA

### North Korea Interested in Funding Missile

93P50088Y Milan *CORRIERE DELLA SERA*  
in Italian 1 Mar 93 p 7

[Article by Guido Olimpio: "Missile from Libya Threatens Italy"]

[Text] A new missile is threatening the Middle East and other southern Mediterranean countries.

North Korea has decided to furnish to Iran the latest "jewel" of its missile production: Next April—according to what we have been told by Arab Emirates military sources—the Pyongyang regime will send 10 of its No Dong 1, a ground-to-ground weapon with a range of approximately 1,300 km and capable of carrying 800 kg chemical warhead.

The bases for the new agreement, being held under strictest security, were discussed last November in Tehran at the annual meeting of the joint Iran-North

Korea committee. The generals of the two countries fine-tuned a two-phase plan:

- The ayatollahs will guarantee additional financing for the No Dong 1 program, for which they have already paid approximately \$50 million. In return, the communist regime, hungry for money and orders, will provide 10 missiles to Iran by April.
- After the arrival of the missiles, Tehran will pay the North Koreans an additional \$70 million to obtain the necessary technology to build a missile industry in Iran in the centers of Isfahan and Semnan.

The top leadership of Pyongyang pressured its partners and got the approval to test the missile at an Iranian firing range (probably the one in Shahroud) "If you have problems with the test," the North Koreans said at the secret meeting, "we could turn to Libya." Qadhdhafi, who is interested in the project and has contributed financially to the project, reportedly offered his support.

The North Korean request hides the regime's fear of possible reactions to a missile test in the Asian region. Testing a long-range missile is certainly no small matter, and diplomatic repercussions could be very severe.

Development of the No Dong—capable of reaching cities such as Hiroshima, Kagoshima, and Osaka—has seriously alarmed Tokyo. So much so that the Japanese high command has begun to study countermeasures to ward off the threat, and Mitsubishi industries obtained a license to build the Patriot system, the successful protagonist of the Gulf war.

Concerned about the Tehran-Pyongyang axis, the Japanese Foreign Ministry is investigating the \$4.5 billion financing guaranteed by Japan to Iran: There is in fact the well-founded suspicion that part of those funds will end up financing the ground-to-ground missile project.

A lot of money is needed to fine-tune the missile, and for the past three years the Iranian Treasury has had its problems dealing with a serious foreign debt.

This is why Libya, which is having difficulties in developing its own weapon, the Al Fatah missile, could join the No Dong 1 project.

In the so-called "Central Repair Shop," the Libyans, with the aid of North Korean technicians and German companies, are working on a weapon that could threaten a large part of south-central Italy. "For Tripoli," an expert we met at the weapons show in Abu Dhabi told us, "it could be more convenient to buy the No Dong 1."

The dealings of Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Syria (another country with great military ambitions) have forced the intelligence services to increase the controls on trafficking between the West and the Middle East.

Therefore, the purchase of ammonium perchlorate, a missile propellant, and other technologies on the part of able intermediaries in Europe, have not gone unnoticed.



## MOROCCO

### Increased Cooperation With Sweden Planned

93AF0354A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE  
in French 15 Jan 93 p 32

[Article by D.B.: "Morocco-Sweden: Toward an Ideal Partnership"]

[Text] Swedish companies have some of the most advanced technology: 80 percent of turnover is generated by exports. Morocco offers a prospective market of 30 million consumers—100 million for the Maghreb as a whole. Bringing companies and markets together for the benefit of the region is the leading objective of the Morocco-Sweden Association for Economic Cooperation...

The Morocco-Sweden Association for Economic Cooperation is holding an economic seminar on 8 February at Casablanca's Royal Mansour Hotel. Presiding over the session will be Mr. Hassan Abouyoub, the minister for external commerce, external investments, and tourism, and his Swedish counterpart, accompanied by a large delegation of presidents and other executives from 13 Swedish companies.

Organized as part of a bilateral effort to build partnership and stimulate trade, the seminar is being held to "ensure continuity" in the association's efforts to make itself better known in various business circles. It is also somewhat unusual in that it is so precisely targeted, notes Mr. Kamil Benjelloun, who took over as president of the association on 15 December 1992.

The association has scheduled five round tables on diverse economic themes with Swedish experts as presenters.

#### Industrial Take-Off

The first round table will focus on food-product packaging, including new technologies. The topic of the second is water treatment and drainage. David Berlin of Scandia Consult will speak on management and quality issues relating to running water.

The third round table will be devoted to "transport ecology," that is the transport industry and the environment. The speakers are experts from Volvo and Scania.

In the fourth round table, officials of Atlas Copco Suede will discuss mines and new mining technologies. In the fifth, wood and wood-product industries will be discussed by the director of the Swedish wood producers' association.

The day's events will also include finalization and signing of the draft agreement providing for creation of a mixed committee of heads of enterprises representing CGEM [Moroccan General Economic Federation] and the Swedish Businessmen's Federation.

That will mark the real take-off point for cooperation between businessmen of the two countries. As Mr. Kamil Benjelloun notes, "with a demographic potential of 30 million inhabitants, a future Maghrebian market of 100 million consumers, and some of Sweden's most advanced technology, many things can be done."

Hardly a latecomer, the association has been working since its founding in 1982, under the leadership first of Abdeslam Berrada and later Omar Benjelloun, to increase economic and cultural exchanges and improve relations between Morocco and Sweden. The remarkable adaptability of Swedish companies to diverse environments, both technological and social, makes this country an "ideal partner" to stimulate new growth in a wide range of Moroccan industries.

In fact, a number of projects have already been completed. Among them are the joint-venture textile factory built at Tangier and the Scania plant. Other projects are still in the gestation stage: a maritime transport partnership; the Ericsson project; Hundesbank-Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank [BMCE].

It should also be noted that earlier initiatives have contributed to the realization of certain projects and stimulated more exchanges.

For example, there was the mission of Moroccan businessmen held in Sweden last May (with External Commerce Minister Abouyoub in attendance), and the week-long Morocco-Sweden workshop held in Morocco, which was attended by 250 people, including a large delegation of Swedish businessmen.

The visit of officials from EKN [Export Credit Guarantee Board], the Swedish counterpart of SMAEX [Moroccan Export Insurance Company], helped promote trade between the two countries, as obstacles that had previously obstructed the granting of export credits were lifted.

#### Cultural Exposition

Another initiative was the visit of officials attached to the Swedish embassies of the UMA [Arab Maghreb Union]. The aim here was to start ensuring the level of coordination needed to increase trade between the UMA countries and Sweden.

The economic cooperation missions, which the new president of the Morocco-Sweden Association for Economic Cooperation, Mr. Kamil Benjelloun, will organize during his two-year term should give relations further impetus.

"Targeted" visits will be organized in different sectors such as agrofood packaging and water treatment. Cultural exchanges are also envisaged.

The association plans to organize a Moroccan cultural exposition in Sweden. The purpose of such an event is to give Morocco's heritage a "new look" and to burnish its image.

**Islamist Movement Once Dormant, Said  
Awakening**

93AF0365A Algiers EL WATAN in French 19 Jan 93  
p 8

[Commentary by Amel Boumediene: "Morocco: Fear of Fundamentalism"]

[Text] The king of Morocco is moving on to another stage. The veiled remarks strongly indicating the resentment he feels against Algeria are a thing of the past.

Now he is publicly displaying a hostility that he had been holding in for too long. Some people will say this is a predictable attitude on his part, because he had already shown some disappointment in the hours following the suspension of the election process in Algeria.

Today he is saying out loud that he would have preferred to see the fundamentalists take power in our country, which he described as a "laboratory" in the newspaper EL CHARK EL AWSAT, an Arabic-language daily published in London. When asked in that same interview whether he feared the growth of fundamentalism in a neighboring country like Algeria, Hassan II replied that "it would certainly have been more sensible to let the election process continue, because the result would have been a profitable experience not only for Morocco but also for Egypt and Tunisia." He also said that that was the only way to find out how the "fundamentalists will manage to extricate themselves with all their contradictions."

One need not be an expert politician to deduce from this that he is very much afraid of seeing Algeria recover its domestic stability and its international prestige.

Algeria, which has undertaken an implacable struggle against fundamentalism and terrorism and is again making its voice heard abroad, is upsetting the strategy of the royal palace, which wants to be the Maghreb's only spokesman in the world.

But beyond all those considerations, it is clear that if Hassan II is speaking so openly about fundamentalism, which he says "finds its home in poverty and injustice," the reason is his fear of seeing the further growth of such a phenomenon in his own country, since that would inevitably endanger his throne. Otherwise, why did he recently tell a newspaper in the United Arab Emirates that he was "determined to settle the conflict existing between Sunnites and Shi'ites"?

The meeting he had on that subject with a high-level official in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs delighted President Rafsanjani, who said he hoped to see a Moroccan emissary in Iran in the near future for the purpose of finalizing the necessary preparations for a meeting between Sunnites and Shi'ites. That is certainly one way for the Alawite throne to try to conceal Morocco's domestic problems and neutralize Moroccan fundamentalists.

But it is also a way to implicitly admit that latent fundamentalism exists in his country and that the phenomenon is beginning to grow in extent.

We should recall the violent disturbances organized by students affiliated with Islamic fundamentalist movements that shook the universities in Rabat, Oujda, Casablanca, and Marrakech and put a stop to all school activity. Hassan II, who "would have preferred to see Algeria in the hands of the fundamentalists," did not hesitate, for his part, to imprison more than 30 or so people who had participated in the demonstrations and to bring another group to court in Oujda.

But despite the repression, illegal activity by the fundamentalist movements is continuing.

Meetings are being held and tracts are still being distributed in the universities and even the secondary schools, where an agitation movement was reported not so long ago. Moreover, we have learned from reliable sources that attacks on Moroccan police forces have already claimed over 23 victims.

Moroccan opposition leader Moumen Diouri, whom we contacted on this subject, told us that things were truly no longer what they used to be in Morocco, and as proof, he mentioned the recent events that have shattered the universities in the big cities.

He also said that agitation among the Moroccan people was growing in intensity every day and that despite the repression, Moroccans "are beginning to stir."

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**Illal Amam Leader on Democratic Movement**

93AF0389A Algiers EL WATAN in French 26 Jan 93  
p 11

[Interview with Abraham Serfaty, leader of Illal Amam, by Amel Boumediene; place and date not given: "Power Must Return to the Moroccan People"]

[Text] *The king of Morocco has just publicly exhibited his hostility towards Algeria. "Might this be one way of winning the Moroccan Islamicists who are questioning his tyranny over to his cause?" asked Mr. Abraham Serfaty, the leader of the Moroccan opposition party Illal Amam, who furthermore analyzed recent events that have shaken Moroccan universities.*

[Boumediene] In your opinion, are the recent events that have shaken the universities in large Moroccan cities a passing phenomenon or are these the first glimmers of some generalized resistance?

[Serfaty] You really have to put the movements at the Moroccan universities in the general framework of the surge of democratic forces in Morocco now under way. Several of the Moroccan universities, such as the one in Fes, are bastions of the progressive struggle in Morocco. In others, the Islamic movement is more predominant.

To this should be added the fact that with regard to its main forces, this movement is equally opposed to the tyranny of Hassan II. But the mark left on this movement by reactionary fanaticism and the sectarianism that still prevails within it among progressive students have allowed the government's police to mount operations in which both sides oppose one another instead of together confronting the common enemy, the enemy of the Moroccan people, the tyrannical government, and the lackey of Hassan II's imperialism.

However, the rise now under way of the Moroccan democratic movement, which is crystallizing around the platform issued by political and labor union leader Noubir Amaoui who is the secretary general of the Democratic Labor Confederation (CDT), so that "the king cannot govern," which earned him a two-year prison term [sentence as published]. This rise, the unanimous rejection of Hassan II's constitution by all of Morocco's democratic forces, the unity that is growing in the actions of all of its forces, especially around the CDT, and the committees to free Noubir Amaoui and all political prisoners in Morocco, the coming of age and, at the same time, the political and ideological radicalization under way in this movement, suggest that an ever greater process of struggle and organization among the Moroccan people has begun, even including civil society. It was because of these assumptions that last 30 August our organization, Illal Amam, called for establishing as a central objective, in this stage of the present struggle, an objective that could still require several years of struggle and the rise of all sorts of people's organizations, the holding of a constituent people's congress.

In a word, power must return to the people. I think that victory in this area will be seized during this decade.

[Boumediene] What opinions do you have of the most recent elections to have taken place in Morocco?

[Serfaty] I already expressed this opinion in an article in *LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE* last November. This past year Hassan II again tried to spruce up his appearance for the rest of the world through a new constitutional and electoral masquerade. This masquerade fooled no one abroad, and the foreign operation produced no result despite the backing of the French government, as could be seen by the recent condemnation of Moroccan policy by the European Parliament on 21 January.

[Boumediene] For some time activities by Moroccan Islamicists have been becoming more intense, this despite continuing repression. Could the kingdom really be threatened, or is this just a passing phenomenon?

[Serfaty] In my first answer to your question, I mentioned to you those elements that make it possible to get an overall view of the rise of the Moroccan people's struggles. Assuming the Moroccan democratic forces know how to maintain and expand the course that began to emerge during 1992, I think that the most probable alternative for Morocco to the tyranny of Hassan II is

democracy. Then we will be able to take an effective role in the building of a people's Maghreb and in the struggle of the entire Arab nation and, first of all, of our brothers the Palestinian people to free them from the yoke of imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reaction.

[Boumediene] In a recent interview granted to a journal in the United Arab Emirates, the king of Morocco stated that he wanted to "reconcile Sunnis and Shi'ites." So a Moroccan emissary is being awaited by Rafsanjani. How would you explain this?

[Serfaty] Behind this soothing statement lurks Hassan II's determination to play the imperialism game once again. Imperialism, not having been able to bring our brothers the Iraqi people to their knees, is trying to divide them into religious groups and pit the Shi'ites of the south against their Sunni brothers, all this even though throughout this century the Iraqi people have fought against imperialism. By this statement, Hassan II has added ideological ammunition to the machinery of the imperialist plot against the Iraqi people, just as he did in military terms at the time of the Gulf war, and he is running as a candidate on behalf of imperialism so as to play a special role in this plot.

[Boumediene] During the same time, he was hurling accusations at Algeria, which he would have liked to see be in the hands of the Islamicists. In your opinion, why all of a sudden is he demonstrating his public hostility towards Algeria?

[Serfaty] All his life Hassan II has been a determined adversary of the Algerian people's struggle for liberation. We remember his role in the case of the hijacking of Ben Bella's airplane in late October 1956 and the assault on the young Algerian republic in October 1963. Today he is backsliding and, what is more, he is decking himself out in the fine role of a provider of lessons on the subject of democracy, whereas the hangman of Tazmamart and the tyrant of the Moroccan people lacks the qualifications to do so.

[Boumediene] With that demagogue's statement, is he at the same time trying to win Moroccan Islamicists over to his cause, whereas the democratic movement in Morocco is gaining strength and calling his tyranny into question?

[Serfaty] That is possible. For my part, I earnestly hope that our brothers, the Algerian people, can regain the road to democracy as quickly as possible; that road cannot be divided.

I am convinced that the progressive forces within the Algerian people will be able to regain the road back to a new rise of Algerian socialism, one that respects the flowering of its identity as an Arab-Berber people tied to Islam's values of justice and the universal values of rights for the human being, woman and man.

The conversation I had the honor of having last month in Barcelona with brother Ahmed Ben Bella strengthened



me in this conviction. In this way the road will be cut off to all plotters who are the enemies of the Algerian people.

[Boumediene] Don't you think that the king's bitter tone with regard to Algeria threatens the stability of the greater Maghreb and makes the regional union that people have called for even more fragile?

[Serfaty] The greater Maghreb union can only come about as a "people's Maghreb," to use the late President Boumediene's proper expression. As long as the tyranny of Hassan II's absolutist Makhzenian government afflicts the Moroccan people and also as long as the Saharan people's right to self-determination under Security Council Resolution 690 is not observed and implemented, such a union can only be a decoy.

To the wish that I expressed earlier to our brothers the people of Algeria I would add that for the people's Maghreb to come about, it is also essential that human rights and democracy at last be established in the sister country of Tunisia.

#### **Plan for Increased Phosphate Production Detailed**

93AF0389B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE  
in French 12 Feb 93 p 6

[Article by Leila Jalal: "The Moroccan Phosphates Office (OCP): Nearly 4 Billion Dirhams in 1993 for Morocco Phosphorus V and VI"]

[Text] *The Moroccan Phosphates Office [OCP] anticipates receiving an allocation on the order of 3,993.3 million dirhams to carry out all of the projects planned for the year 1993. Furthermore this year the production of phosphates will show an increase on the order of 11.9 percent. Production will thus reach a volume of 21.97 million metric tons. Anticipated production of phosphate derivatives will go from 5.07 million metric tons in 1992 to about 5.357 million metric tons in 1993, or a 5.6 percent increase.*

The year 1993 will bear out the course chosen by the government two decades ago, which was to expand a phosphates industry by means of setting up major chemical processing and fertilizer-producing complexes.

Indeed the ambitious program, which got off the ground in 1965, when the Maroc-Chimie unit in Safi went into production, was brought to fruition with the building of the Morocco-Phosphorus I and II units on the same site, and III and IV in Jorf Lasfar.

Construction of the Morocco-Phosphorus III-IV chemical plant was completed as part of the integrated regional development [program] that brought together several national sectors.

So basic, large-scale infrastructures were put in place to respond to the needs of the phosphates industry and the activity spurred by the development of the Doukkala area.

#### **Three Million Metric Tons of Phosphoric Acid and Fertilizer**

That industry, which was already up and running, produces a full range of phosphate-based fertilizers for agricultural use and is one of the most modern and most efficient in the world. It makes it possible for Morocco to process more than 40 percent of its crude phosphate production locally.

As it pursues this strategy, this year the OCP will launch work to build the Morocco-Phosphorus V and VI complex at Jorf Lasfar. The anticipated start-up of production for this major undertaking is 1995.

The opening of this complex will provide for the production of more than 3 million metric tons of phosphoric acid and fertilizer and thus make it possible for Morocco to move further in the area of local processing of phosphates.

Indeed this project, whose objective is the processing of 5 million metric tons of phosphates annually, is essentially made up of four parts:

- One phosphoric acid production plant with a capacity of 1.4 million metric tons of  $P_2O_5$  per year.
- One sulfuric acid production plant with a capacity of 4.5 million metric tons per year.
- One phosphate-based fertilizer plant with 2.7 million metric tons of DAP [diammonium phosphate] fertilizer per year.
- One "utilities and water treatment" segment, with a 110-megawatt heating plant.

In tandem with this project, work on a wet phosphate loading station meant for Morocco-Phosphorus V and VI will also begin in 1993. This station will have a capacity of 10 million metric tons per year and require an overall investment of 170 million dirhams.

OCP's program for 1993 also includes the building of two transportation lines for loose and bagged fertilizer to supply two mixed loading gates at the port of Jorf Lasfar.

The overall cost of this project, which will be operational in 1995, is 280 million dirhams.

Last, the OCP will begin construction of four chemical vessels (ships) to export phosphoric acid and then import chemical products, for an overall cost of 1,746 million dirhams. It should be pointed out, furthermore, that undertaking these projects will lead to the creation of 3,587 jobs, of which 3,300 will be posted by the Morocco-Phosphorus V and VI complex in Jorf Lasfar.

#### **Phosphate Production and Processing**

Phosphate production should reach 21.97 million metric tons as compared with 17.6 million metric tons in 1992, or an 11.9-percent increase. Production of derivative products will reach 5.357 million metric tons, 2.7 million metric tons of which will be for phosphoric acid.

This production will come from four mining centers, those in Khouribga, Youssoufia, Benguerir, and Boucraa/Laayoune.

Given the technological advances that the phosphates sector is experiencing, 80 percent of phosphates mined today are produced by the open-pit method, the remainder being produced underground, of which 80 percent is supplied by the mechanized sector. Indeed the mining of phosphates at the Khouribga center, which began underground, has gradually changed to become essentially an open-pit operation.

Similarly the new Benguerir mining center is run as an open-pit operation.

In addition, in each case, the phosphates yielded undergo different processing, something that requires setting up washing, drying, roasting, and dry enrichment operations.

As part of this, the year 1993 will see work continuing on the project to restructure the roasting units in Youssoufia, a project that had already been launched in 1992.

This unit's goal is to bring roasting capacity up to 4.9 million metric tons per year instead of the present 2.9 million metric tons. The overall cost of this project, which will go into production in 1994, is 200 million dirhams.

With regard to projects already launched at the start of this decade, in 1993 the OCP will pursue its work on infrastructures and equipment necessary to run open-pit operations at a new phosphates mine in Sidi Chennane.

This mine will take over from operations that are about to run out at Khouribga. Its production capacity is 12 million metric tons per year.

Work on this project began in 1991 and requires an allocation on the order of 3,179 million dirhams, 1,926 million dirhams of which will be in [hard] currency, financed in large part by the Spanish.

Such a project required setting up a processing plant whose minimal capacity will be 4 million metric tons. This plant will be operational in 1995 and require the sum of 683 million dirhams to be built.

#### **Benguerir Mine Opening**

Furthermore, 1993 will see the start of three projects. The first concerns eight bagging plants for fertilizer meant for export at Jorf Lasfar.

The second concerns two loading units with a 4,000 metric tons per hour capacity at the port of Jorf Lasfar. Last, 1993 will see the Benguerir II mine begin operations, replacing the Benguerir I mine so as to continue supplying Morocco-Phosphorus II with wet sifted phosphate. The overall cost of this project is 289 million dirhams, 148 million dirhams of which will be in [hard] currency.

The start-up of this mine will make it possible to increase the production capacity of the Benguerir mining center from 3.1 to 6.5 million metric tons per year by using existing infrastructures and equipment.

The phosphate produced at the Benguerir mining center is sent in wet sifted state to Safi, to be washed there then processed into phosphate-based derivatives at the Morocco-Phosphorus II plant.

So the sum allocated by the OCP for the year 1993 to launch Morocco-Phosphorus V and VI underscores with a certain degree of emphasis the launching of a big public works policy as anticipated by the finance bill.

#### **Comparative Trade Analysis on Phosphate**

93AF0319A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE  
in French 18 Dec 92 p 17

[Article: "Morocco Keeps Leading Position on International Market"]

[Text] Efforts made by the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office] have paid off both qualitatively and quantitatively, as shown by changes in the world market this year. At a time when its main competitors were experiencing declines, Morocco increased its market shares.

Total world exports of phosphates and derivatives (expressed in units of  $P_2O_5$ ) for the period ending 30 September 1992 declined by 1.9 percent, according to statistics recently published by IFA [expansion not given]. Nevertheless, while the United States and Togo recorded losses of 10.1 and 21.1 percent, respectively, Moroccan deliveries increased by 4.2 percent, and Jordanian exports rose 2.2 percent.

Contraction of the world phosphate market continued in the period ending 30 September, with an overall 5.1-percent decline from the same period in 1991. The contraction was caused primarily by reduced levels of exports from the United States (-1.25 million tons or 29.7 percent) and Togo (-637,000 tons or 28 percent). Morocco, by contrast, increased its exports by 2.2 percent, expanding its share of the world phosphate market to 33.4 percent, 2.4 points over the level for 30 September 1991.

World exports of phosphoric acid (including superphosphoric acid) were virtually unchanged: 2,298,000 tons of  $P_2O_5$ , compared to 2,283,000 tons as of 30 September 1991. Deliveries from the United States and Tunisia diminished respectively 14.2 and 10.6 percent, owing to the decline in exports of SPA [superphosphoric acid]. Morocco's deliveries meanwhile grew by 9.8 percent.

It should be noted that the volume of phosphoric acid sales has continued to grow, showing an increase of 21.2 percent as of the end of September.

### Fertilizers

The world fertilizer market has been uneven. The DAP (diammoniac phosphate) market declined 2.2 percent, with the United States being most affected (-6.1 percent). Morocco's exports increased 2.8 percent.

The MAP (monoammoniac phosphate) market fell 2.7 percent as of the end of September 1992. Morocco exported 28,050 tons, compared to 79,500 tons for the same period in 1991, a 64-percent slide.

By contrast, exports of TSP [triple superphosphates] were up 21 percent. Morocco's sales rose 23.2 percent.

### Ait Youb-Matmata Hydroelectric Complex Described

93AF0324A Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French 31 Dec 92  
p 3

[Article: "More Details About the Ait Youb-Matmata Complex"]

[Text] Completion of the Ait Youb-Matmata complex, whose opening ceremony on Tuesday was presided over by King Hassan II, is part of a program to develop the Haut Sebou that began when the Idriss I Dam went into operation in 1973.

The Ait Youb-Matmata Complex, which the King christened the Allal El Fassi Dam, will divert 600 m<sup>3</sup> of water annually from Sebou Wadi to the Idriss I reservoir. This regulated flow will increase the irrigated area of Gharb by 25,000 hectares [ha] and make it possible to produce 270 million kWh [kilowatthour] of power a year. It will also supply water to the cities of Fes and Kenitra.

The Ait Youb is an earth dam whose reservoir will hold 80 million m<sup>3</sup> of water.

The Matmata tunnel, which is 15 km long and has a diameter of 4.5 meters, provides a flow of 38 m<sup>3</sup>/second.

The Ait Youb is one of a series of hydroelectric and agricultural water projects on the Haut Sebou. It is an earth and rock dam 61 meters high. It has a volume of 1 million m<sup>3</sup> and its reservoir holds 80 million m<sup>3</sup>.

The dam's main role is to supply the Matmata tunnel so that it may carry water from the Sebou to the Idriss I basin at a maximum flow of 38 m<sup>3</sup>/second. Average annual volume will be 600 million m<sup>3</sup>. A hydroelectric plant will use the drop of some 200 meters between the two reservoirs to produce an average of 270 million kWh a year.

In addition, the water thus diverted will increase the irrigated area of the Gharb Plain by 26,000 [sic] ha and provide drinking water to Fes and Kenitra.

The 15.45-km-long Matmata tunnel has its intake on the right bank of the Ait Youb Dam reservoir about 850 meters above the dam. It is the biggest underground

construction in Morocco. Despite great technical difficulties such as enormous pressure on supports, the presence of large karstic cavities, and water seepage, excavation was completed ahead of schedule thanks to the competence and determination of the entire crew that directed the project. All excavations and the pouring of concrete are finished 100 percent.

### Matmata Tunnel Equalization Basin

The Matmata tunnel equalization basin located along Fes-Taza road some 50 km from Fes will make it possible to supply the future Matmata hydroelectric plant. Flow to plant equipment will be 160 m<sup>3</sup>/second during the three to four peak hours daily. Based on transferrable volumes from the Sebou to Inaouene, Matmata's optimum flow has been set at 38 m<sup>3</sup>/second. In order to guarantee an optimum supply to the Matmata plant, plans include the construction at one end of the Matmata tunnel of an equalization basin that will temporarily store the continuous supply of water having a flow rate of 38 m<sup>3</sup>/second in order to meet peak demand. The buffer needed for such equalization is 1.5 million m<sup>3</sup>.

This artificial basin will be comprised of a homogeneous ring-shaped dike. A flood water spillway will serve as an overflow for the dam. Construction of this equalization basin began in early 1990.

### Matmata Hydroelectric Plant

The Matmata hydroelectric plant, located on the bank of the Idriss I reservoir 50 km from Fes, will use the approximately 200-meter drop created between the Sebou Ait Youb and Inaouene at Idriss I. The plant will have three 80-megawatt generators and harness a total flow of 160 m<sup>3</sup> under a gross nominal drop of over 183 meters, the nominal drop being 172 meters.

The plant will produce an average of 270 million kWh of electric power annually. Power will be carried at a tension of 225 kV [kilovolt] by three lines: two to the center of the national system (from the El Oualii post) and one to the East (Selouane post). (MAP [Maghreb-Arab Press Agency])

### Union Demands, Strength of Political Exiles Noted

93AF0325B Algiers EL WATAN in French 16 Dec 92  
p 11

[Article: "Morocco: Union Demands"]

[Text] On Monday, only a week away from a resumption of the dialogue between the Moroccan Government, unions, and economic and social groups, the opposition press published the main points of demands being presented by three unions: the Democratic Labor Confederation (CDT), the General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), and the National Union of Higher Education (SNE-SVR).



The demands, formulated on 30 October 1990 and reiterated in a letter sent to the government on 30 November, are based on three main points, the first concerning recognition of and respect for union rights.

The second has to do with social problems and the enforcement of existing laws.

The third concerns improvements in the status of wage earners, revision of the system of remuneration, and the tax system.

In addition, on Monday, the Committee To Support Moroccan Trade Unionist Noubir Amaoui, sentenced in May to two years in prison for remarks about members of the government deemed to be "defamatory," demanded his release or the transfer of his case to the Court of Appeals.

According to members of the committee, Amaoui's case "remains blocked in the Rabat Court of the First Instance despite the petition for appeal filed by his attorneys on the very day he was sentenced."

For his part, Abraham Serfaty believes that exile may be "worse than prison or torture."

The newspaper EL PAIS, to which he granted an interview, recalls that Serfaty was sentenced to 17 years in prison for his opposition to the regime of King Hassan II and his defense of the Saharan people's right to self-determination. It points up the Moroccan dissident's "indefatigable work for democracy and in defense of human rights and democratic change in Morocco."

Serfaty believes that Moroccan political exiles can play a key role in forming an opposition front abroad, working closely with progressive forces at home.

Serfaty is critical of the current situation in Morocco where, he says, neither the "recent elections nor the destruction of Tazmamart prison resulted in any essential change in the Moroccan dictatorship."

The proportions assumed by the flow of illegal Moroccan immigrants are a direct reflection of this situation, says the Moroccan dissident. While understanding the "concerns of European countries," he believes it is a mistake to try to halt such immigration by police methods.

"Moroccan young people are desperate and are not afraid to face death," he adds. (APS-AFP)

#### **Figures Show Standard of Living Improving**

93AF0325A Algiers MAG 7 in French 3 Jan 93 p 5

[Article: "Standard of Living Improving"]

[Text] In 1990-91, Moroccan citizens spent an average of 6,780 dirhams a year or 565 a month, double the 1985 figure. Food and housing remained the biggest items, reflecting a higher standard of living, Moroccan statistics experts observe in a report summarizing the national survey of the standard of living of households.

Statistics officials partly attribute the increase in spending to higher wages, a lessening of the government's commitment to compensation, and a drop in inflation during the 1985-90 period.

Even if their relative importance shows a downward trend, the report adds, food and housing remain the biggest expenditures. However, other major items in consumer budgets are education, entertainment, hygiene, and medical care.

The trend toward a reduction in spending inequalities observed in 1985 is confirmed. The report emphasizes the gap between the wealthiest 10 percent in terms of jobs, and that the active population (9,933,000 persons in 1991) has risen at an annual rate of 2.8 since 1987, corresponding to a net annual labor supply of 262,000 persons—this labor supply is attributable for 63.3 and the urban milieu [sic].

In relative terms, the report notes, active workers comprise nearly 39 percent of the total population. Their participation in productive activity was 44 percent in rural areas and 33 percent in the cities, the gross rates of activity in 1990-91.

The data also indicate that 65.1 percent of all jobless persons are male, relatively young and with little experience, but with a good level of education and training.

In terms of living conditions, the report notes that the positive effect of the various promotional measures taken for housing has continued. In rural areas, for example, the decline in the number of persons living in marginal housing has become irreversible. The proportion of families in such housing went from 24.4 percent in 1991 to 14 percent in 1991 [sic], while the drop in such housing and the least wealthy 10 percent was reduced by 14 percent [sic], the same rate of reduction as in the number of poor.

Based on the definition of poverty given by the World Bank, statistics officials observe that the number of poor persons has dropped in absolute as well as relative terms. "The proportion of poor people went from 30 percent in 1985 to 15.4 percent in 1990-91, and their total number went from 6.6 to 3.9 million, a drop of 14 percent."

However, the document adds, the inequality of schooling based on sex persists in rural areas, where the rate of elementary school attendance for boys between the ages of seven and 13 is an estimated 53.6 percent, compared with 28.3 percent for girls.

Among the reasons why children in this age group are not in school, statistics experts cite "parents' lack of financial means to pay for their children's schooling." "The lack or inadequacy of elementary schools, particularly in rural areas, is another principal reason why children between the ages of seven and 13 are not in school.

An analysis of public health and the resulting demand for medical care indicates that every month, 15.2 percent of

all Moroccans run the risk of falling ill or being injured and that 53.5 percent seek medical and health care.

Nearly two-thirds (63.3 percent) of such consultations are private, while the rest (36.7 percent) are in the public sector.

Doctors, with pharmacists and nurses lagging far behind (86.6, 7.8, and 4.0 percent), provide almost all health care. [text missing] goes for more sanitary housing (apartments and permanent housing). In 1991, some 48.4 percent of all citizens were living in their own housing, compared with 37.5 percent in 1971.

In rural areas, the proportion of substandard housing is declining. At the same time, more and more housing is of masonry (26 percent in 1991 versus 14 percent in 1985).

Concerning literacy and education, the survey shows that 45.3 percent of all Moroccans over the age of 10 can read and write, compared with 35 percent in 1982.

The rate of primary school enrollment for city children between the ages of seven and 13 is 82.4 percent for boys and 78.7 for girls.

The Moroccan Office of Statistics notes that data for this multipurpose survey were collected between October 1990 and November 1991, based on a representative sampling of 3,400 households from all economic regions and social strata in the country.

## OMAN

### Agreement With Yemen 'To Open Cooperation'

93AE0263A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
28 Dec 92 p 2

[Article: "Exchange of Documents on Border Agreement Opens Areas of Cooperation Between Yemen and Oman"]

[Text] Oman's Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id received a written letter from Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih on 27 December 1992. It was delivered by Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. 'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani and concerned bilateral relations between the two countries, as well as ways to bolster and develop them.

Sultan Qabus received the Yemeni minister shortly after signing the minutes of exchange documents relating to an agreement to delineate the border between Yemen and Oman, which was approved on 1 October 1992. Exchanging the agreement documents is considered a preparatory step toward depositing the agreement with the United Nations and the Arab League, so that it will have Arab and international recognition after it is ratified by the two countries.

Diplomatic sources told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that Yemeni-Omani relations are in line for major developments in the near future. They said that accomplishing an agreement to delineate the border between the two

countries is a historic act on behalf of the people of the two countries and will lead to increased opportunities for cooperation and coordination between them in various fields.

The agreement requires that the border be extended in a straight line from the point of Darbah 'Ali on the coast of the Arabian Sea to the point 52.19 north latitude. That straight line then zigzags, with each country conceding pieces of territory to the other in an amicable settlement that was satisfactory to and approved by the residents of the border areas in both Yemen and Oman.

In a statement to the Omani News Agency, al-Iryani said that his visit to Oman is an expression of the high level reached by the relations between the two countries following the signing of the border agreement. He added that by exchanging the ratification documents, the agreement has become consummated and implemented, opens welcome horizons for cooperation between the two countries, and facilitates communications between the two populations.

Press items stated that Oman and Yemen are presently studying the construction of the first highway connecting the Yemeni border governorate of al-Mahrah and the Omani province of Dhofar through a range of towering mountains in that region. A few days ago, an Omani delegation composed of a large number of businessmen held talks in Sanaa with Yemeni businessmen. The Omani delegation was led by Ya'qub Bin-Hamad al-Harithi, chairman of the Omani Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Businessmen in Oman are looking to Yemen as a possible additional market for the Omani market, which could absorb important quantities of goods manufactured in Oman. They believe that they can benefit from laws that encourage investments in Yemen by entering into joint projects with their Yemeni colleagues, especially in Aden. That city will be made a free zone after the completion of arrangements currently being made by the Yemeni Government.

### Financial Data on Bank Operations Reported

93AE0263B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
27 Dec 92 p 9

[Article: "Significant Improvement in Omani Bank Performance; Percentage Allocated for Loans Rises to 10.7 Percent"]

[Text] The Omani Central Bank reported significant development in the performance of commercial banks in Oman during the year ending September 1992.

Total commercial bank assets rose 6.2 percent, and loans to the private sector and public organizations totaled 10.8 percent, reaching 1,056.8 billion Omani riyals, compared with 953.5 million riyals in September 1991.

Commercial bank loans to the government (including treasury bonds and development securities) jumped from 1.3 million riyals in September 1991 to 184 million riyals in September 1992.

With regard to liabilities, the report referred to the rise in total private sector deposits in commercial banks by 5.4 percent, reaching 964.1 million riyals, compared with 914.9 million riyals in 1991. This increase concentrated on savings deposits, which rose by 31.1 million riyals to 244.6 million riyals. Deposits on demand and deposits on account totaled 9 million riyals during the same period.

Private sector deposits in hard currency dropped 18.5 percent, totaling 132.9 million riyals. This was the result of a lower interest rate on American dollar deposits, compared with the interest rate on Omani riyal deposits.

The capital base of commercial banks also improved by 7.5 percent to a value of 130.3 million riyals, while credits and retained interest increased 29 percent, reaching 113.4 million riyals. The credits and retained interest formed 10.7 percent of the total value of credit permitted for the private sector and public institutions as of the end of September 1992, compared with 9.2 percent at the end of September 1991.

The Central Bank report stressed that the growth of the money supply, in its broad meaning, in the Sultanate of Oman reflects the growth that has occurred in government expenditures and the extent of its influence on the economic activities of the private sector. The report makes clear that the money supply in Oman increased 9.4 percent in 1989. This was basically attributed to the net increase of foreign assets and the rise in credit permitted for the private sector.

Despite the increase in gross domestic product—in constant prices—by 3.3 percent, the inflation rate amounted to 1.3 percent, compared with an increase of 9.4 percent in the money supply. According to the report, this is attributable to a decrease in the rapid turnaround of money and the strength of the national economy's structure.

The rate of inflation increased in 1990 to 10.1 percent, despite the 10 percent increase in the money supply for the same year. This is nearly the same percentage of increase for 1989.

The report attributed this, primarily, to unnatural and record increases in rents, maintenance, water, and fuel, totaling 32 percent. The inflation rate (after excluding these items) was only 1.5 percent. In 1991, the money supply increased 5.5 percent, despite the decrease in the rate of growth of the money supply from 10 percent to 5.5 percent. The inflation rate decreased by a lesser amount, dropping 10.1 percent to 7.2 percent in 1991. This was because the changes that occurred in the money supply did not appear to have had as much effect on the inflation rate. It requires some time before inflation rates are affected.

## SAUDI ARABIA

### Al-Jizan Set To Receive International Shipments

93AE0271A Jeddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 16 Jan 93 p 5

[Text] Al-Jizan Port, which is located in the extreme southwestern part of the kingdom at 17 degrees north longitude and 42 degrees 20 minutes east latitude, is considered the principal harbor for imports from all over the world to the southern part of the kingdom. This port also provides development projects with services and meets the southern region's needs quickly and with great efficiency.

The port is also considered the third largest on the Red Sea coast. In fact, it is able to meet the various water transportation industry needs and is attracting increasing numbers of international shipping agents.

Al-Jizan Port has been extensively developed in order to make it match the big increase and diversification that took place in the southern region's imports.

As a result of the strategy adopted by the General Ports Administration to establish and develop Al-Jizan Port, several modern piers have been built to accommodate the largest commercial ships. In addition, the port has been provided with services, infrastructure, and other facilities.

The provision of the most advanced freight-handling equipment in the development plan enhanced the port's operational efficiency, enabling it to meet the increase in the volume of imports. The volume of imports handled in 1403H [1982] was 1.8 million tons, compared with 590 tons before the development plan, and it reached 17 million tons in 1410H [1989].

The number of ships that used the harbor during this period was 1,776, and the average volume unloaded daily on each pier was 1,200 tons. This unloading average is very large compared with unloading averages for world harbors. This unloading efficiency attracted the attention of both international commercial circles and international shipping companies.

With regard to the development plans, Hamud al-Sa'di, general manager of al-Jizan Port, said that because the General Port Administration was keen on developing and increasing the port's efficiency to meet future increases in the volume of imports, it had taken the necessary steps for developing and enlarging the harbor. Among the steps taken were the provision of equipment and infrastructure, the building of piers, the enlarging of open warehouses and the construction of covered ones, the modernizing and developing of freight-handling methods, the standardization of handling equipment, the ensuring of water transportation safety, the improvement of canal transportation, the provision of maritime telecommunications, and the enhancement of management efficiency.

All of the developments executed at al-Jizan Port cost about 100 million riyals.

'Abdallah Bin-Sa'id Abu-(Maliha), chairman of the board of directors of the Chamber of Economy and Industry at Abha, said that, with regard to the economic and developmental impact of Al-Jizan on the southern region, this port is considered to be one of the most modern and efficient because it contains modern and specialized equipment, as well as a telecommunications network. He also indicated that this port was considered a cultural achievement that demonstrates the advanced stage of development of the country.

Abu-(Maliha) further indicated that it is necessary to vitalize the port's activity and induce both importers and exporters to use it. The fact that the port has been provided with the most modern technology and services, both of which meet the standard of what would be provided in the ports of developed countries, should help promote it.

#### **Piers and Warehouses**

There are 12 piers at al-Jizan Port. Two of them handle containers; two serve roller ships, and one is for livestock. The remaining seven piers are for handling other commodities. All of the piers are provided with all of the required services. The underwater depth of the piers is 14 meters. There is a special pier that is 205 meters long to accommodate floating equipment and tug boats. This pier provides maintenance service for equipment. There is also a special pier for fishermen.

The port has nine warehouses and has the capacity to store 62,000 tons of goods. Six of the warehouses are for goods, and one is for livestock. In addition, there is open space for storing construction materials, equipment, and cars. There is also an open area of 100,000 square meters as an extra space for the containers pier.

The port authority provided a large warehouse, with an area of more than 3 million square meters, for the storage of importers' goods. The port also has been provided with some modern maritime tugs that have 2,500 horsepower engines. These tugs, which are piloted by Saudis, are used to guide commercial ships.

#### **Navigational Safety**

In order to provide safe navigation to all ships arriving at the port, the port administration has provided the port with modern navigational guidance equipment, such as floating docks and guidance signals that stretch for 80 maritime miles along the sides of the north entrance to the port. The control tower, which is 60 meters high, guides incoming and outgoing ships.

The provision of the most modern equipment to unload and handle both packaged and nonpackaged goods, as well as construction materials has enhanced the port's operational efficiency.

The port's general manager said that the Ports General Organization had assigned loading, unloading, and handling operations to a specialized Saudi company. As a result, the handling cost declined from 150 to 15 riyals per ton.

A data processing center was established, and it includes modern computers that are linked to the central office. Specialized programs were developed to monitor warehouses, smaller computers in the different departments, and telecommunication equipment in the port.

Al-Sa'di concluded his remarks by indicating that the Saudi professional staff had recorded high levels of proficiency in the areas of port operation, guidance, and management. This staff was—thanks be to God—100 percent Saudi, and they performed their work very well indeed.

### **SYRIA**

#### **Scud Missile Site Established Near Hims**

93P50067A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 19 Feb 93 p 1

[Text] Syria recently established a Scud missile site. This was revealed by the Abu-Dhabi newspaper AL-DIFA' AL-KHALIJ. The newspaper says the site was set up near the city of Hims in northern Syria and contains 18 fixed-missile launchers.

Syria has recently made great efforts to enhance its ballistic missile launch capability. In recent months, among other things, an Italian ship carrying launch tubes was intercepted. The source of this shipment was apparently Germany. Likewise, Damascus has signed agreements with China for improving its missiles.

### **TUNISIA**

#### **Annual Meeting To Assess Agricultural Development Held**

93AF0395A Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE  
in French 8 Feb 93 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Mr. Zouaoui to Periodic Meeting of Regional Agricultural Development Commissioners: 'Provide Agriculture With All It Needs for Sustained Growth'; A Region By Region Check-Up on Agricultural Development"]

[Text] Saturday morning the periodic meetings of the Regional Agricultural Development Commissioners [CRDA] got under way at the Higher Agricultural Engineering School in Mezez El-Bab. Mr. Mouldi Zouaoui, the agriculture minister, presided at the first meeting of 1992-93, with Messrs. Ameer Horchani, the state secretary at the Agriculture Ministry in charge of water resources; and Hedi Ayach, the governor of Beja, in attendance.



The agenda for this meeting had five points, viz, a look at the 1992 and 1993 budgets, the trend in agricultural seasons, the identification of integrated programs, and progress of the irrigation infrastructure maintenance campaign. Work would also be done to look at two studies, the first relating to regional studies of regional agricultural development and new studies which needed to be designed.

In the speech that he delivered for the occasion, Mr. Mouldi Zouaoui expressed his pleasure with the tangible improvement he had observed in the area of document and file preparation as well as better follow-up on programs, which was the result of financial and human resources provided by the state and the result of the restructuring of regional and central administrations.

The minister alluded to the delays that had occurred in certain projects, especially in hillside lakes, noting that despite the recorded improvement, this work should be pursued by organizing a national meeting to which affected promoters would be invited and at which 10-year programs would be introduced so that all parties would be ready to assume their duties.

Participants next assessed the progress of different campaigns, beginning with the citrus fruit campaign, in which 8,000 metric tons have thus far been exported as compared with 5,000 for the same period last year and in light of the significant drop in prices for these products on traditional markets.

The same is also true for dates, where production this year reached 75,000 metric tons, of which 14,000 were exported at a price of 39 million dinars.

With regard to the [vegetable] oil campaign, it is expected that production will reach 120,000 metric tons, of which 60,000 have already been gathered by the National Oil Office. As for the olive harvesting operation, it reached an 80 percent rate.

On the subject of fruit-tree planting, 24,000 hectares of fruit trees and 12,500 feet of olive trees will be planted this season.

The agriculture minister emphasized the necessity of consolidating tree nursery inspection so as to guard them from diseases and parasites.

With regard to scientific research, study tours have been made to the different commissionerships so as to become aware of problems that have been ranked in order of priority and importance for each region involved.

Mr. Mouldi Zouaoui furthermore emphasized the necessity of making grain producers more aware of operations to combat parasites, and recommended that they use state of the art irrigation, taking the low amounts of rain recorded into consideration, so as to come up with good yields, both quantitatively and qualitatively, especially because dam supplies are very satisfactory, which furthermore is the case with ground water.

## UGTT Decision To Enter Elections Examined

### Background on Decision

93AF0401A Tunis REALITES in French

8-14 Jan 93 pp 15-16

[Text] Will the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT) enter candidates of its own in the 1994 legislative elections? That is the question on everyone's lips, the underlying topic of every conversation of late. It is an interesting question whose many facets tend to confound the skeptics. It would not have been news except for the many behind-the-scenes negotiations that it may well give rise to and the turning point in the country's politics that it represents. The UGTT has always been present in political life and is no stranger to the country's governing institutions, but never before in its political activities has the labor federation felt the need to branch out on its own, making independence an official goal. It now seems to intend to do just that. Why? What is the UGTT contemplating and how will it approach the 1994 legislative elections? Nothing specific has been decided, except the basic principles that were recently announced. However, a great deal is happening at UGTT headquarters on Mohamed Ali Street—so much so that one would think that the campaign period had already started. Could the UGTT upset the normal order of things in the legislative elections? "What if it does?" Union officials seem to be saying unanimously, "So long as that is good for the country and in line with the democratic process."

On 22 December 1992, in the final report on the proceedings of the UGTT's Administrative Commission, the federation's general secretary, Mr. Ismail Sahbani, announced that the UGTT should have a presence in all the country's governing institutions. The 10th point in the report states: "The Administrative Committee endorses all the electoral law reforms suggested by the union membership and confirms the imperative for union representatives to be present in all constitutional institutions, including the legislature, in the interests of free and independent decisionmaking by the labor movement."

These goals could not be more clearly expressed. The UGTT is ruling out (for now) any possibility of forming a coalition or united front. Its foremost concern is to differentiate itself and reposition itself on the political map which, by all indications, promises to be a closer reflection of the true representative weight of the country's vital constituencies, as announced by the president in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on 27 December: Tunisia is entitled to have a legislative body that is a true reflection of the reality, representative of the full range of political views. With that in mind, the UGTT wants to prepare for the next elections in its own way, using whatever forms of participation it may deem necessary for its activity. As if for added emphasis, it has established parameters that it must respect because they were issued by one of its most important bodies, the Administrative Committee. In that vein, the mere fact of

invoking free and independent decisionmaking means in essence that the UGTT has drawn a line that it cannot overstep under any circumstances in its future activity. Point 10 makes that perfectly clear. In these basic principles, union officials—through the intermediary of their Executive Office—are expressing a desire both to reflect the reality of the country and be in harmony with their aspirations and objectives. With its 8,000 local unions nationwide (most of them renewed) and 60,000 officers representing 400,000 members, the UGTT has good reason to want a presence in a pluralistic Chamber of Deputies.

### Lessons of the Past

We noted earlier that a coalition or united front seems out of the question, for now. There seems to be unanimity on that score at UGTT headquarters. The idea of an independent slate of candidates has eclipsed all other possible alternatives. Past experiences give union officials good reason to dismiss all hypothetical scenarios and focus on a single form of participation in the future legislative elections. But first, let us examine how it all came to this point. The UGTT has never—or almost never—been without a presence in Tunisia's governing institutions, beginning with the Constitutional Council (Ahmed Tlili, Habib Achour...). Representation in the legislature is not an exclusive goal for union officials. On the contrary, and the past is highly instructive. To cite only one such instance, there is the sad example of the events of January 1978 when an activist labor front was formed in Parliament. As in all joint activities lacking clear guidelines of representational weight, the labor legislators were often unable to make themselves heard above the others and there were many very difficult moments, which combined with other factors to maintain confusion and blur the lines of distinction. While a few legislators in office today continue to further the views of the UGTT in Parliament, they do so out of personal conviction and not as official spokesmen for the union membership. Then there is the memory of the 1981 legislative elections, which led to one of the most serious crises the UGTT has ever known. Because it is still present in our minds, we remember in detail the painful confrontation between union officials over forming a united front with the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] to which the majority were completely opposed. The rift resulted in a long period of hard times and disillusionment. We know the rest of the story.

### The Possible Scenarios

In a way, it is the conclusions drawn from negative past experiences that has caused the union membership to seek its own path in the legislative elections. And it seems more than ever determined to take that path. It has already established three guiding principles for action: to conduct itself with the degree of independence that labor activity requires; to attempt to follow democratic principles in its activities both inside and outside the large building on Mohamed Ali Street; and to unify all initiatives at all levels of action. Fielding candidates

on independent slates in the next election is in line with these three principles. But does that mean that a coalition or united front—with the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) or any other political party—will never be considered? Union officials are fairly clear about that. A joint effort involving other partners could come under consideration (although the percentage is small) if, and only if, individual differences can be respected. In other words, each partner would have its distinct goals.

At present, there is a reluctance at UGTT headquarters to take a categorical position on this matter. They are quick to bring up the idea of an independent slate, but they do not rule out the rest. In any case, they tell us, it is still too early to take a stand, and the decision belongs to the UGTT's highest levels—either the Administrative Committee or the national congress. However, the next congress is scheduled to convene not long before the legislative elections, and that may prevent it from being the forum for a final decision.

In short, while the general idea of some form of participation has been decided, the means have yet to be determined. Already, three possible scenarios are haunting the minds of unions officials. At the root of this battery of potential worries there is but one factor: How to achieve the goals established by the Administrative Commission with the best chances of success? It is a dilemma that is beginning to emerge inside the UGTT. From a decidedly Manichaean perspective, some readily cast the problem in the following terms: "If we run as independents, we will be called a labor party. If we join a united front, we will be accused of retreating into the past. If we participate alongside the opposition parties, we will be flatly charged with forming an alliance against the government." That is a sampling of the union's present concerns.

### What Really Counts

The democratic process that is now taking place in Tunisia is an undertaking to which everyone must contribute. For that, the UGTT is the perfect partner. It is the UGTT's duty to rise to this shared mission. The UGTT has set as its goal the realization of the aspirations of its membership. The decision it reached in its Administrative Committee on 22 December—which some are quick to describe as a thrust (as a policy statement, at least)—can make the legislative elections the setting for a debate that will be beneficial to the entire country. Will the UGTT overturn the political map in 1994? The future holds the answer to that.

### Reaction of Opposition Parties

93AF0401B Tunis *REALITES* in French  
8-14 Jan 93 pp 16-17

[Article by Mohamed Bouamoud: "The Opposition Caught Off Guard"]

[Text] Several days ago, the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT) decided to cross the Rubicon: It announced—and confirmed at the meeting of its Administrative Committee on 21 and 22 December—its intention to enter the 1994 legislative elections and declared through its general secretary, Mr. Ismail Sahbani, that it "will fight to have a presence in all institutions, including Parliament, so that it can defend the interests of workers and the gains achieved by the people."

This new development, unexpected to say the least, has raised a host of questions in the minds of all. Foremost among them is how the opposition parties will react. The views of a majority of the parties, presented below, make it clear that the UGTT's move comes as a nasty blow to the opposition, which is both skeptical and somewhat outraged. It views the UGTT announcement as the end of alliances and close solidarity among the parties.

In the main thrust of its statement, the Party of Popular Unity (PUP) confides that it "does not believe the UGTT's decision is final" because "it is impossible for the labor federation to contemplate fielding its own lists of candidates in competition with parties opposed to its philosophy, because that would force it to propose economic and social alternatives." The PUP feels that "it is uncustomary in Tunisia and elsewhere for a labor organization to enter its own candidates in an election, since that would involve mounting a campaign and could pit the unions against the ruling party in a confrontation over policy differences lasting well beyond the election." In addition, "independent tickets by the UGTT are bound to have negative repercussions on the cooperative relationship between the labor federation and government and on the candidates fielded by the opposition parties."

The Progressive Socialist Progressive Rally (RSP) views the problem in terms of "the nature of the role of the political parties and the role of the labor federation." According to the RSP, the problem is one of ensuring that UGTT members are allowed to follow their own political consciences. "The role of the political parties as defined by the electoral code—which we want to see reformed—is to serve as a vehicle for the citizens' participation in the electoral process. Which leads to the following question: Why, in the current political context, is the labor federation—which is not a political party—contemplating a bid for seats in the legislature? The RSP adds that "while the political reality has not satisfied the needs of workers, the UGTT's decision will encourage other movements and organizations to entertain plans to enter the race with their own candidates on independent slates—women, youth, farmers, and others." In short, the RSP "respects the UGTT's decision" but believes that the UGTT "must allow its members to support the parties of their choice." It also hopes that the "UGTT's decision will not have a harmful boomerang effect."

When asked if the UGTT dampen the opposition parties' chances of winning seats in the legislature, the Social Party for Progress (PSP) began by stating that the "the

UGTT's entry in the elections is against the law governing political parties." It added that, "we were used to seeing the UGTT in a coalition with the RCD [Constitutional Democratic Rally]—in other words, the former PSD [Destourian Socialist Party]." Returning to the question, the PSP remarked that "the entry of UGTT slates would inevitably force it to distribute seats on a proportional basis, thus reducing the opposition's chances of entering the legislature. The UGTT's decision means fewer seats for the opposition. Our reaction is understandable: We are unhappy about the UGTT's decision!"

The remarks of the general secretary of the Unionist Democratic Union (UDU) are similar although not from the same perspective. They require no additional comment: "1) Every Tunisian citizen has the right to run for office provided that he meets the requirements contained in the Constitution. 2) As the son of Ahmed Tlili, the former general secretary of the UGTT, I have always been careful not to pass judgment on the policies of the labor federation. 3) However, as the leader of a newly created political party largely led by members of the working class, allow me to express a wish, and then I would like to raise a question. First, it is my wish that the new direction announced by the UGTT—namely, its entry into the March 1994 elections as an independent force—does not come as a counterweight or in opposition to the democratic movement. That would be unfortunate for the UGTT, for democracy, and for Tunisia. Now, as for my question: The UGTT has always been tempted by political activity. In 1963, Ahmed Tlili himself drafted the proclamation for a labor party. That draft was the culmination of a long debate dating back to the days of the late lamented Hached. I have the following questions for the UGTT leadership: Is now a good time to create a labor party? If so, wouldn't it be better to form a political party before fielding candidates...?"

Will the UGTT back down and decide to return to a coalition with the opposition parties? If so, its recent decision will eventually be seen as nothing more than a brief episode. Or will it press ahead at the risk of selling itself short across the board? There is little likelihood that this muddled state of affairs will clear up before the start of the new political season.

[Box, page 17]

Abstentions: The Movement of Democratic Socialists (MSD) offered no reaction, preferring instead "to await the UGTT's official and final decision."

The Tunisian Communist Party refused to make any comment.



### UGTT Intent To Stand for Elections Examined

93AF0394A Tunis REALITES in French  
29 Jan 93 pp 24-26

[Article by Moncef Dellagi: "The Debate Over a UGTT (Tunisian General Federation of Labor) Presence in the Legislative Elections]

[Text] It is easy to understand why the intention of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT) to field its own candidates in elections constitutes a problem for both the UGTT and public opinion: The UGTT would be entering an election under its own banner for the first time since independence. It would also be a political "first" in that, according to conventional wisdom, labor unions do not enter candidates of their own; that is the role of political parties, at least in the democratic countries.

Our purpose here is to shed more light on the question and to offer thoughts pertinent to the debate. Toward those ends, we will need to look at the past, present, and future.

#### The Past

From the 1956 vote for the Constituent Assembly until the 1969 legislative elections, the UGTT took part in elections as the partner of the Neo-Destour Party in the National Front. The political context lent itself to such an arrangement.

In fact, the Neo-Destour and the UGTT governed as a team. It is true that the Neo-Destour had pre-eminence, but it can also be said that the UGTT was in power. Tunisia had a leftist government as evidenced by the many social reforms that were enacted or by the fact that economic and social policies were essentially oriented toward the common masses. But despite its close involvement in governmental decisionmaking, the UGTT was unable to prevent a mistake, widespread collectivization, and the blow that followed.

#### Lesson No. 1: The Dangers of Too Much Dependence

The failure of the collectivization policy led to an abrupt change of course and was at the root of two transformations: In the first, public opinion turned against the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the state, and in favor of an economic policy of increasing recognition for the private sector and greater political freedoms (the mistake was attributed to the lack of such freedoms). Even the progressive-minded government turned conservative in that it sought to conserve the gains of progressivism.

The second transformation was that a polarization between the workers and the wealthy began to be perceived. Consequently, the UGTT embraced this trend and swung towards a clear perception of its uniqueness and its autonomy. After 1970, in fact, the UGTT under Habib Achour's leadership behaved or tried to behave as an organization independent of the Neo-Destour Party

and the government. The appearances of cooperation were maintained (Achour remained in the Political Bureau, the UGTT participated in the 1974 legislative elections, and H. Nouira's social pact was accepted), but the UGTT and Habib Achour did all they could to differentiate the labor federation from the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) and the government and to bring out the various opposition leanings among union members as a counterweight.

This caused both the UGTT and the government to toughen their respective stands and eventually led to the general strike (which was not really warranted by labor situation) and the events of 26 January 1978.

#### Lesson No. 2: The Dangers of Too Much Independence

In the early 1980s, the UGTT obtained the government's recognition of its autonomy. But, as it watched the PSD weaken and the Islamists gain ground, the UGTT and Habib Achour concluded that they, themselves, were the only political force in the country that could effectively challenge and unseat the governing party. The UGTT overestimated its strength and this clouded the thinking of many. The result was the destabilization and the dismantling of the UGTT. No one reacted, except perhaps the Islamists who were delighted at the thought of having the field to themselves.

#### Lesson No. 3: The Dangers of Overestimating Oneself

After 7 November [1987], the UGTT's autonomy was reaffirmed in both words and deeds. The labor federation, functioning normally and in compliance with its bylaws, was brought in on all major decisions by the government. More than that, the climate became one of calm, mutual respect, and a shared willingness to find solutions to problems. Everyone had learned the lessons of the past. It is now acknowledged that, in addition to defending the interests of workers, the UGTT is an important factor in the country's general equilibrium.

Consequently, all Tunisians—those who are sensitive to the concerns of labor and those who are not—feel that the UGTT should be allowed to carry out its role. Moreover, it is evident that the UGTT is rising from its ashes. Its rebirth will take time and, above all, sound and prudent management.

Such is the setting in which the question of UGTT candidates in the legislative elections has been raised. The UGTT's participation in the elections should be examined in the following terms: Is it in the interests of the UGTT, in view of the federation's current status and in relation to its own conception of the role it should play in Tunisia?

The UGTT's intention to field candidates of its own needs to be debated from the perspective of the law and customs and from the perspective of how advisable it is. Tunisian electoral law does not expressly forbid the UGTT from putting forward its own slates of candidates. But according to the spirit of the law, the electoral



process is reserved for the political parties, and independent slates are intended for unrecognized parties. In addition, it is customary—at least in democratic countries—for labor unions to refrain from running for political office. In Europe and in America, trade unions limit their involvement to backing a political party either publicly or behind the scenes—usually the socialist parties in Europe and the Democratic Party in America. Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, there has been a desire to keep these two spheres separate. In short, trade unions in the democratic countries do not participate openly and directly in electoral contests.

There remains the question of how advisable the UGTT decision is. The labor federation maintains that its better interests lie in having representatives in the Chamber of Deputies in order to make its voice heard. No doubt there is a definite interest in that, but to place labor union candidates in the running is to turn the union into a political party, whether or not that is the intent, with all the advantages and disadvantages that entails.

It also turns the union into the representative of a fraction of the population. It means losing the valuable trait of universality and inclusiveness, its representation of workers as a whole and its ability to transcend political differences. It opens the door to multiple labor unions reflecting multiple political parties. The UGTT needs to be protected from such a major risk. In addition, what would a UGTT caucus in the legislature be—a progovernment group, an opposition group, or an issue-oriented group? Parliamentary dynamics will force it to be an opposition group or at least to be perceived as one. Is that what the UGTT secretly wants? We doubt it.

Having a delegation in the legislature will allow UGTT representatives to talk, but nothing more than that. It must be remembered that in Tunisia, real power resides in the presidency and not in the legislative branch. Consequently, if the UGTT wants to strengthen its position and win the enactment of social benefits, it can do so only through the same sort of close relationship with the presidency that it now enjoys. Many problems can be solved in one-on-one discussions, but not in public deliberations in which battle lines are sharply drawn and the temptation to outbid one's opponent is present. This would only dramatize labor-management relations and compromise the problem-solving process.

Beyond the principle of whether trade unions should enter their own candidates in elections, the advisability of doing so should be determined on the basis of the political context. The next elections will revolve around two questions: 1) Does the Islamist movement pose a threat to Tunisia? and 2) Has Ben Ali done a good job of running the country? The candidates and the voters will define themselves by their answers to those questions.

The UGTT has to answer "yes" to both questions. True, the UGTT is not completely satisfied with the government's handling of labor issues. Several of its criticisms have not been heeded. Its primary criticism is that

income from capital has grown much faster than the income from labor. In addition, the UGTT is fearful of a runaway market economy, if the private sector is left to its own devices. The labor federation has wisely kept troublesome demands from dominating its public message. In so doing, it looks to the broader interests of the country, and that has won respect for the federation and given it an image of responsibility.

In reality, the UGTT and the government are on the same side, as the rise of an Islamic state would spell the end of the labor movement. For that reason, in the next elections, the UGTT will have no choice but to support the governing party, whether explicitly or tacitly. Then, why enter an electoral contest that is focused on the very choices that the UGTT supports ("no" to the Islamists, "yes" to Ben Ali), a contest that will force the UGTT to distance itself from the very policy it is currently pursuing? Why compromise the UGTT's universal recognition and its secure position in the political and social system in exchange for an unguaranteed place in the legislature where it can do nothing but talk? Why become a quasi-political party competing with other political parties?

Furthermore, is the UGTT certain to win a few seats, given the provisions of the electoral code? Those who know the UGTT from the inside, those who have a sense of its true influence in Tunisia, are very doubtful that it will win a respectable showing. The UGTT rightly boasts that it represents the labor world and should therefore be able to translate that support into votes. Nothing could be less certain. Should it win a meager 10 percent of the national vote, the conclusion would be that the UGTT represents a mere 10 percent of the population and that would be a hard blow to the labor movement. It would not be wise to make the same mistake as 19th-century European liberals who demanded universal suffrage, convinced that the people, in their overwhelming numbers, would vote for them. After gaining the vote, a large segment of the populace remained under the spell of traditional cultural influences and voted for conservatives and even reactionaries.

Is it advisable for the UGTT to enter the next elections? We do not think so.

#### The Future

The decision whether or not to field labor union candidates will also depend on the UGTT's conception of the Tunisia of tomorrow and its own role in that future.

To move to the heart of the matter, the UGTT continues to be closely associated with the state-run economy (civil service and state-owned companies). Its ability to recruit members, its power, and its potential are rooted in the existence of a powerful public sector in Tunisia that is a source of stable, relatively well-paid jobs that offer considerable social insurance coverage. This explains the UGTT's involvement in government, the difficulty of maintaining its independence from government, and the implicit acceptance of an authoritarian government. In

the inter-related structure of things, when the economy is controlled by the state, political freedoms and society's autonomy are automatically curtailed. Tunisia is now moving toward a market economy, but it is highly unlikely that the state-run economy will disappear as the predominant force, and the private sector—despite its expansion—is likely to remain under state control in one form or another. It would be erroneous to think that the economy will be governed entirely by market forces, given the technical or political hurdles. In short, the basic factors—those which determine the UGTT's position—will not change significantly. The UGTT will remain a social force of a patriotic tone, i.e., working within a broad national, popular configuration and not overplaying the theme of class struggle. In addition, the UGTT will continue to be involved in government; it will continue to be a component of the state system; and the UGTT and the government will continue to remind each other of their mutual dependency. The UGTT and the government are doomed to a love-hate relationship. The UGTT's interest, vocation, and destiny are to ensure that the trade unions have continued good relations with the government or, at most, a foothold in government and a foothold in the opposition, although it must be an unique form of opposition and not the conventional type that sets its sights on gaining power.

It remains for the UGTT to adapt to the environment of a two-sector economy, both public and private. Rather than concentrate on defending the public sector, it would behoove the UGTT to create, in an atmosphere of democracy and pluralism, an extensive labor movement that could counter-balance any excesses in the private sector and, more important, offer the masses a social framework and purpose for action. In order for this strategy to be effective, the UGTT would have to rely on the state as well as on its own resources and work closely with the state in order to prevent any negative effects of free-market practices; furthermore, it must not allow the state to be taken over and controlled by others.

This entails difficult effort, but it can be done, given the existing climate of mutual respect and close consultation between government and the labor federation, and particularly now that the lessons of the past have been learned. For the role it should play, the UGTT has strong points as well as weak points.

Its strengths are its historical roots, its presence in the National Movement (i.e., its involvement in the destiny of the nation), its foresight in opting to join the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) rather than the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), its long experience, its solid grounding in modernity, the existence in Tunisia of a political center of gravity on the left (thanks in part to the UGTT itself), and its willingness to support the country's development goals.

But the UGTT has many serious flaws: a weakness for politicking; the lack of importance it places on activities to educate the people, on sustained, long-term action

among the working classes; and its exclusive preference for the public sector, which has left it absent from the rural world and weak in certain segments of the private sector. One may well ask whether the UGTT is doing anything at all in the areas of mutualism, activities for young people, the press, the encouragement of social and democratic values, assistance to the unemployed, and so on.

The UGTT has an obligation to enhance its strong points and correct its weak points. Its calling is not to engage in politicking, much less to take the reins of government; its calling is to take the political high ground: The UGTT should make its views known and, if necessary, take action when the stakes are of national importance, but not involve itself in day-to-day governing, entering the fray only to be applauded one day and booed the next. It is hoped that the UGTT will conserve its strength to carry out its mission and obligations, that it will steer away from needless compromises and devote its energies to fostering a greater social sense as an integral part of patriotism.

The UGTT is right to want to be present in the next elections. An electoral campaign gives rise to debate, and it is preferable that the UGTT take part in that debate and make its presence felt not by entering or supporting candidates but by informing the voters of the real stakes in the elections, by educating them in a nonpartisan way. The UGTT can be present in the debate by launching a campaign to guide voters and raise voter awareness, informing them of where their interests and the interests of the country lie and the meaning of civic duty.

In so doing, the UGTT will remain a national institution, untouched by the vicissitudes of politics. The UGTT, with its solid standing and its prestige at home and abroad, can be of great service to the country as a resource in times of need, a political and moral force capable of influencing the course of events.

#### **UNFT Kairouan Activities Reported**

93AF0395B Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE  
in French 7 Feb 93 p 6

[Article by Fatma Zaghouani: "UNFT (National Union of Tunisian Women): Kairouan Executive Committee Gains New Blood"]

[Text] The sixth congress of the Kairouan regional bureau of the National Union of Tunisian Women [UNFT] was held Saturday, 6 February, with the theme: "Women in the New Era: Their Role, Responsibility, and Equality" and attended by 92 delegates, 39 section presidents, deputies, activists from the Constitutional Democratic Rally [RCD], and a number of cadres from the region.

The work of this congress was brilliantly opened by Mmes. Naima Ben Hamouda, the secretary general of the UNFT's executive board; and Moufida Chetali, a member of the UNFT's executive board, with Messrs.

Noureddine Hafsi, the governor of the region; and Mohamed Negra, the secretary general of the RCD's Coordination Committee, in attendance.

"It is up to the Tunisian woman to show that she is a dynamic element in Tunisian society, and an element that is taking an ever more active part in the development, renewal, and democratic program, which the head of state has undertaken," it was strongly emphasized from the speaker's rostrum.

After studying the business and financial reports concerning the numerous activities of the outgoing board, many congress attendees spoke approving of the practical measures that had been taken by Ben Ali on behalf of women, the very measures that will open to them the doors to every area of public life, with its political, economic, and social components. Furthermore, they expressed their deep conviction that Tunisian women will be able to handle the responsibilities, confidence, and expectations that have been placed upon them. Congress attendees affirmed their willingness to fully assume their responsibilities with a view to providing effective help to improve their condition, accept the challenges of development, and build a balanced democratic society.

With regard to the woman in the countryside who often does not have the means to assume her tasks of training and management, speakers noted that a direct appeal had been made to the UNFT's structures to step in where greater awareness is needed to alert women to the mission with which they have been charged: "The UNFT's first objective is to conduct campaigns with women in the countryside so as to make them more aware," it was noted.

It should be mentioned that out of 20 candidates, 13 were elected. And Mme. Fatma Allani, the president of the UNFT's Kairouan regional representation, was reelected to her post.

Last, we should note that the Kairouan congress was the fifteenth, after those in Kasserine, Sfax, Beja, Jendouba, Tozeur, Gafsa, Tataouine, Sousse, Ben Arous, Mahdia, Monastir, Medenine, Siliana, and Kebili, in the series of structural reform of UNFT chapters in all governorships.

Because of this reform, the women's organization was able to attract new blood, which would strengthen its ranks and play a constructive role with a view towards increasing the participation of women in development and public life.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### Planning Minister Notes Increase in GDP

93AE0272C London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 21 Jan 93  
p 13

[Report from Abu Dhabi by Shafiq al-Asadi: "Planning Minister Cites Improvement in All Sectors; UAE (United Arab Emirates) Economy Recovers from Gulf Crisis"]

[Text] Shaykh Humayyid Bin-Ahmad al-Mu'alla, the UAE [United Arab Emirates] planning minister, emphasized that the nation's gross domestic product [GDP] grew last year by 4.8 percent and is expected to continue growing at higher rates in the nonoil sectors, especially in trade and in the remanufacturing industries sector.

Al-Mu'alla, in press statements issued in Abu Dhabi the day before yesterday, advocated linking economic and industrial development in the UAE to the economic plans and integrated development of other GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states. He said that the recent GCC summit in Abu Dhabi last month has created a climate that is conducive to economic cooperation at all levels and in all sectors. He expected that the region would experience more economic cooperation and enter into agreements this year that would influence the move toward development as a whole.

He disclosed that now that the UAE economy has recovered from the Gulf crisis, the nation's GDP rose in 1992 to about 131 billion dirhams (\$30.5 billion) from its level of 125 billion dirhams during the preceding two years.

He added that recovery in all sectors is a reason for optimism and for adopting appropriate economic policies. He pointed out that despite the drop in the domestic product of the oil sector, which accounts for 42 percent of the UAE gross product, other economic sectors accomplished high rates of growth last year. Agriculture and fisheries grew by 6 percent; remanufacturing industries grew by 2.8 percent; transportation and communications grew by 8 percent; and trade grew by 3.7 percent.

He emphasized that 1992 was a year of economic boom in the UAE, as the value of investments climbed to 27 billion dirhams from 25 billion dirhams in 1991, driving off economic stagnation and providing a strong impetus for development.

He added that actual consumption outlays rose from 76.3 billion dirhams in 1991 to 83.1 billion dirhams last year. The value of commodity exports likewise climbed from 77 billion dirhams to 79 billion dirhams in 1992.

The UAE planning minister said that future development plans in the UAE will strive for an equilibrium between social and economic development and will target a population mix (1.9 million people) that preserves the Arab nature of society.

He added that because of urgent need, the ministry had determined that a population policy will be the cornerstone of any future plan for social and economic development. He said: "Future UAE plans will also focus on utilizing the oil wealth (2.3 million bpd [barrels per day]) to restructure the economic climate and increase the contribution to national income of other economic sectors in order to lessen dependence on oil. Furthermore, investing available monetary surpluses in productive



assets abroad will provide desirable diversification of national sources of income."

Al-Mu'alla said he expects rapid expansion in economic sector in the UAE, especially in the industrial sector.

#### **Foreign Aid Increases \$1.6 Billion in 1991**

93AE0272B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 18 Jan 93 p 9

[Report from Abu Dhabi by Shafiq al-Asadi: "UAE (United Arab Emirates) Foreign Aid Jumps by \$1.6 Billion"]

[Text] The UAE [United Arab Emirates] Central Bank disclosed that foreign aid donated by the UAE in 1991 amounted to 17 billion dirhams (\$4.62 billion) for an increase of 6.2 billion dirhams (\$1.78 billion) over 10.8 billion dirhams (\$2.9 billion) in assistance to other nations a year earlier.

A bank report on UAE economic developments through the middle of 1992 attributed the increase in foreign aid to the Gulf crisis.

Observers point out that the UAE shared the cost of the war to liberate Kuwait that carried out by international forces. This is the first time that such figures have been released by an official body.

The bank said that increased foreign aid helped shrink the UAE current account surplus, which declined by 68.8 percent to 6 billion dirhams, from 19.1 billion dirhams in 1990. This also helped narrow the balance of trade surplus.

But the Central Bank also disclosed that the UAE economy benefited by the Gulf crisis because of increased crude oil exports at higher prices as a result of suspended Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil exports. This benefit to the UAE peaked in 1990, when oil prices climbed to \$40 per barrel. Oil prices, however, softened again in 1991, but the values of exports, imports, and re-exports continued to rise, bringing near normalcy to capital flows after the meteoric rise of 1990.

The bank said the UAE's balance of trade had a surplus of 30.2 billion dirhams (\$8.2 billion) in 1991, down from 37 billion dirhams (\$10 billion) a year earlier. The decline is attributed to the decline of oil prices from \$21.2 per barrel in 1990 to \$17.7 per barrel in 1991.

The bank explained that the decline in the value of oil exports was a result of the higher volume of exports in response to increased demand and in observance of OPEC policies, while the value of imports increased sharply [as published]. The values of nonoil exports and of reexports also climbed.

The Central Bank emphasized that capital flows returned to near normalcy in 1991. The balance of debit capital declined from 20.2 billion dirhams in 1990 to 820 million dirhams in 1991. The balance of payments

bounded back from a deficit of 1 billion dirhams in 1990 to a surplus of 5.18 billion dirhams in 1991.

The bank mentioned that the value of noncrude commodity exports rose by 10.4 percent, to 8.5 billion dirhams in 1991 from 7.7 billion dirhams in the preceding year. Noncrude commodities are mostly in refined petroleum products, which vary from year to year from one-third to one-half of such exports, depending on prices of oil and petroleum products, aluminum products, and a variety of other manufactured goods, such as ready-made clothing. Most of these products are exported to Japan, other GCC states, and certain Asian countries.

#### **Abu Dhabi Spends 4.4 Billion on Projects in 1992**

93AE0272A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 13 Jan 93 p 10

[Report from Abu Dhabi by Taj-al-Din 'Abd-al-Haqq: "Abu Dhabi Spends 4.4 Billion Dirhams on Projects Over 11 Months"]

[Text] By 30 November 1992, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi had spent 91 percent of that year's annual appropriations for projects. During that period, the emirate disbursed 4.4 billion dirhams out of total annual appropriations of 4.8 billion dirhams.

Annual project appropriations in the emirate cover allocations for local projects, federal projects implemented in the emirate, and direct work projects.

A report issued yesterday by the Abu Dhabi Planning Department said that expenditures for local projects in the emirate, at 4 billion dirhams, exceeded their budgeted allocation of 3.9 billion dirhams. This means that the ratio of fiscal spending was in excess of 100 percent.

Outlays for federal projects implemented in the emirate and funded by the domestic budget amounted to 198 million dirhams, or 76 percent of their annual allocation of 295.9 million dirhams.

Total expenditures for direct work projects amounted to 211.5 million dirhams, or about 50 percent of the 420 million dirhams allocated.

The Planning Department's report explained that the emirate's Department of Water and Electricity exceeded its annual project allocation by 133 percent during the period under review. Last year's allocation for water and electricity projects amounted to 1.2 billion dirhams, but the department spent 1.7 billion during the 11-month period.

Over-expenditure by the Department of Water and Electricity was attributed by Abu Dhabi financial sources to several new projects that were needed to meet the demands of the current urban boom in Abu Dhabi, which overtaxed the power supply. New residential units that were completed several months ago are still unoccupied because they lack electricity.



The Department of Public Works also exceeded its allocations. Its expenditures during the 11-months period amounted to 806.4 million dirhams, whereas it was allotted only 760 million dirhams for the whole year. Therefore, Public Works project expenditures amounted to 106 percent of the budgeted amount.

The Office of the Ruler's Representative in the Eastern Region spent 61.1 million dirhams out of project allocations of 61.3 million dirhams. This is an expenditure ratio of 99.6 percent.

Expenditures by the municipality of Abu Dhabi during the same period amounted to about 1 billion dirhams, compared with an original allocation of 1.1 billion dirhams, for an expenditure ratio of about 91 percent.

Al-'Ayn municipality spent a total of 344.2 million dirhams, or 58 percent of its allocation of 590.5 million dirhams.

### **Banks Report on Operations, Restructuring**

#### **Revenues, Profits Up**

93AE0244A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 8 Jan 93  
p 12

[Report from Dubayy: "UAE Banks Perform Well in 1992; 48 Banks Have Deposits of \$21.7 Billion"]

[Text] Foreign and national banks operating in the United Arab Emirates [UAE] performed well last year. Economic and financial circles described banking performance as "the best in many years with respect to both returns and deposits."

Banking circles expect the profits of most banks operating in the UAE to be 15 to 25 percent higher than profits in 1991, when the banks performed well in comparison with previous years. The sources said that "certain UAE banks will realize profits as much as 50 percent higher than profits in 1991."

Banking sources said that the most distinctive characteristic of UAE banking performance last year was the agreements that four al-Shariqah-based banks reached with the Government of al-Shariqah to reschedule their debts, which are estimated at about 1.85 billion dirhams (\$500 million) over the next 10 years [as published]. The four banks are al-Shariqah National Bank, al-Shariqah Bank, Ltd., the Investment Bank, and the United Arab Bank.

The settlements, which occupied the attention of the country's national and foreign bankers in the second half of last year, were achieved with the participation of the Central Bank. It reflects the focus of the Central Bank's new management, which is headed by Chairman 'Id al-Marrikhi and Governor Sultan al-Suwaydi, on supporting banks that face difficulties. The new Central Bank management said when they signed the settlements last November that these agreements would enable the

Central Bank to ratify the year-end statements of the four banks and would enable the four banks to take their place in the banking sector and perform their role in the service of the national economy.

Bankers believe that the settlements would greatly bolster confidence in UAE banks in general, and in al-Shariqah banks in particular, because they confirm that both local and federal governments are committed to the banking sector and are keen on supporting banks and bolstering their capabilities in order to help them contribute more effectively to the development process by expanding their loans and facilities to various projects.

A foreign banker in the UAE said that banking sector performance was good last year and that signs of improvement will show as we get closer to the time when last year's statements are released. He attributed the improvement to the positive economic and fiscal climate in the state, as well as to efforts by banks to achieve optimum performance.

He expected considerable growth in various banking activities. Even though it was difficult to forecast an exact rate of growth without seeing the year-end statements, most indicators show that banks have been able to achieve considerable growth rates in various operations and activities, as manifested in adequate profits for distribution to shareholders and for boosting reserves.

A UAE banker said that domestic banks struggled with the problem of nonperforming debt over the past four years and finally gained control of the situation last year when they reclassified their loans and made preparations for the future. Banks also attempted to control their internal operations and improve services to customers by updating equipment and through administrative restructuring in line with global advances in banking. He pointed out that bad loans, as well as nonperforming loans, remain on the books of certain banks, but some of those loans have been frozen and the others have been or are being settled. It would be fair to say that the nonperforming debt problem that beleaguered UAE banks in the 1980's is now behind them and is no longer an impediment to their own development.

Liquidity has been at its highest in several years, even though banks expanded credit operations, especially personal and commercial loans. Cash and other liquid deposits with the 48 banks operating in the country grew to about 80 billion dirhams (\$21.7 billion) from 73 billion dirhams last year-end [1991].

Rising bank liquidity is attributed primarily to increased deposits in the aftermath of disruptions, especially in exchange rates, that shook world markets last year and propelled the repatriation of a considerable proportion of national capital invested in world markets, even though interest rates for dirham-denominated deposits were at a record low of 2 percent.

In response to a question on personal credit, which some banks have greatly expanded in the past two years, a

specialized banker said that banks are taking personal credit to excess in as far as loan size, term, and interest charged, thereby imprudently mortgaging individual borrowers for years to come. Because it is used for consumption purposes rather than for individual investment, personal credit is a burden that causes numerous problems to both banks and individual [borrowers]. He noted that personal credit has begun to pose a threat to certain banks and cautioned that care must be exercised. He added that "this phenomenon will be with us for years to come. It may be said, however, that selfishness in bank lending is disdainful."

Another banker said that the focus of UAE banking operations last year has been on trade financing, which is the main banking activity; on the building and construction sector by funding contractors and their purchases of building materials; and on certain industrial activities, as well as personal credit. All banking activity, in other words, achieved positive growth that kept pace with overall growth and prosperity in all of the state's production and service sectors.

The same banker expects banking performance to remain positive over the next few years and anticipates that banking operations will grow between 15 and 20 percent annually. He bases his forecast on the following conditions: that several huge government projects are being implemented, that oil prices on world markets continue to stabilize or firm-up, and that operating conditions in the UAE are improving thanks to population growth, labor regulations, and facilities to attract foreign investments.

A foreign banker remarked on the "need for small banks in the UAE to merge into stronger financial institutions that are better able to achieve higher profits and to more confidently engage in projects." He added that mergers would require a critical look at the banking system in the UAE where the number of foreign and domestic banks is large—48 to be exact. Competition among those banks is healthy and beneficial to consumers, but it is an obstacle to higher profits.

Banking sources expect that the National Bank of Dubai—with profits jumping from 411 million dirhams in 1991 to estimated 1992 profits in excess of 450 million dirhams—will continue to head the list of all profitable foreign and national banks in the UAE, followed by UAE International Bank, with profits rising from 202 million dirhams in 1991 to an estimated 250 million dirhams this year. The Commercial Bank of Dubai, with 1991 profits of 141 million dirhams and estimated 1992 profits of more than 160 million dirhams, is the third most profitable of all UAE banks. The British Bank of the Middle East, whose profits are expected to rise from 141 million dirhams in 1991 to more than 160 million dirhams this year, is the most profitable foreign bank operating in the UAE.

Dubai Bank, Ltd., was the most profitable of all UAE banks in 1991, with profits of 411 million dirhams, but

it ranked second in assets (24.6 million dirhams), seventh in loans (1.8 billion dirhams), and second in deposits (19.8 million dirhams).

UAE International Bank ranked second in loans (6 billion dirhams), third in deposits (about 8.4 billion dirhams), second in profits (202 million dirhams), and third in assets (11 billion dirhams).

Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank ranked fourth in assets (10.2 billion dirhams), fifth in deposits (6.4 billion dirhams), and third in loans (5.47 billion dirhams).

The Bank of Oman, Ltd., was fifth in total assets (9.77 billion dirhams), but third in profits (172.5 million dirhams) and fourth in customer deposits (6.34 billion dirhams).

The British Bank of the Middle East took fifth place in the size of assets (5.8 billion dirhams), as well as profits (141.3 million dirhams), but ranked sixth in customer deposits (5 billion dirhams) and fifth in loans extended (a total of 3.57 billion dirhams).

#### Industrial Bank Loans

93AE0244B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 8 Jan 93  
p 12

[Report from Abu Dhabi by Shafiq al-Asadi: "Abu Dhabi Industrial Bank Plans 80 Million Dirhams in Loans"]

[Text] The UAE [United Arab Emirates] Industrial Bank will embark in commercial year 1992 on a new credit policy for industrial projects in the UAE. Required guarantees will be reduced from 100 percent to 50 percent of the loan amount. Being a development bank, rather than a commercial bank, it will not offer loans for less than 250,000 dirhams (about \$70,000).

Bank Director General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Baqi said that the bank's board of directors, at a meeting chaired by Muhammad Khalfan, under secretary of the Budget and Resources Department of the Ministry of Finance and Industry, charged bank management with devising new controls and standards for the banking guarantees it requires of its customers. The goal is to halve that requirement from 100 percent to 50 percent [of the loan value].

He added: "The bank's management has done a preliminary study of those standards and is currently preparing a more detailed report for submission to the board of directors at its next meeting in February. The proposed rules will take into account the juridical status of the industrial institution that is applying for the loan, its relationship with the bank, and the manner in which the bank is to finance the project and whether this funding will be in the form of a loan, capital share, or both."

'Abd-al-Baqi explained that the study will also consider both the type of guarantees required and established practices in the various emirates. Other considerations

will be the identity of the project sponsors, their business activities, and the time they are able to devote to the project, as well as the type of product proposed and whether it would have to be marketed domestically, abroad, or both.

He emphasized that the board of directors set a floor of 250,000 dirhams for Industrial Bank loans because it is a development bank for which small loans would not be cost-effective. Small loans, he added, are better served by commercial banks.

#### Central Bank Restructuring

93AE0244C London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 8 Jan 93  
p 12

[Report from Abu Dhabi: "UAE Central Bank Restructures"]

[Text] The board of directors of the UAE [United Arab Emirates] Central Bank has restructured management in an effort to bolster its oversight over commercial banks operating in the country, adapt to banking operations requirements, and maintain pace with developments in central bank management and banking oversight.

The board approved the Central Bank's new structure and said in a statement yesterday that its operating experience over the past several years mandated the reexamination of certain aspects.

Banking sources said that the board of directors is restructuring the Central Bank to reshape its management and stamp it with the board's character, now that a year has passed since it assumed control of the bank, so that the bank may be able to achieve its new objectives and banking strategies in the UAE.

The current board of directors assumed control of the Central Bank at the end of December 1991, with Muhammad 'Id al-Marrikhi as chairman and Sultan Bin-Nasir al-Suwaydi as governor. The latter succeeds former Governor 'Abd-al-Malik al-Hamar.

The new bank structure calls for a standing committee for banking oversight that would resolve all important matters. It also calls for changing the name of the Banking Oversight Department to the Department of Banking Oversight and Monitoring, and the risk center will be separated from it.

The bank's board has also approved the amalgamation of its Treasury, Current Accounts, and Deposit Departments into a single department called the Department of Banking Operations. It also approved merging the Foreign Banking and Investment Departments into its Treasury Department. The Foreign Transfers, Insurance and Credit, Loans and Agreements, and Domestic Investment Divisions will be abolished. The Foreign Accounts and Settlements Division will become part of the Accounts Department. The Correspondents and Economic Analysis Division will be relegated to the Correspondent Bank Administration.

## WESTERN SAHARA

### Envoy Says Saharan Issue One of Decolonization

LD1402231893 Algiers Radio Algiers Network in Arabic  
2200 GMT 14 Feb 93

[Text] The Saharan issue is one of decolonization, and is not connected with a problem between Algeria and Morocco. This is what Algerian Ambassador in Brussels Abdelkader Taffar said in reply to a question on Algeria's stance, should the UN plan on Western Sahara fail and battles resume.

During the international seminar organized yesterday in Brussels under the title, Western Sahara and the new world order, the Algerian diplomat recalled the principled stance that has always characterized Algeria's support for the liberation movements throughout the world, affirming that Algeria still supports the Saharan issue.

Abdelkader Taffar pointed out that Algeria has not spared any effort toward finding a peaceful solution to the Saharan problem, adding that diplomatic efforts will continue and that Algeria remains convinced that a permanent agreement cannot be obtained without an understanding between Morocco and the Polisario Front.

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### Voters Continue Legislative Election Registration

#### Registration 'Normal'

93AE0320A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
23 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Hamud Munsir in Sanaa: "Yemeni Voters' Registration Increased; Opposition Warns Against Foul Play"]

[Text] Yemeni voter registration continued yesterday in all of the governorates as Yemen witnessed slow registration for the second day in a row because of the weekend and the religious holiday. 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Basir, a member of the Higher Election Committee and chairman of the Legal Committee, said in an exclusive statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the registration process is continuing normally under safe and stable circumstances. He affirmed that registration is increasing gradually and that reports from the different regions and governorates indicate a noticeable increase in participation.

Regarding the participation of Army and police personnel, he said that the committee has already decided the issue and has adopted a resolution affirming the right of Army and police personnel to participate in the elections on equal footing with any other citizen according to the criteria and terms approved by the committee. He added: "The Higher Elections Committee is preparing to discuss the adoption of the rules

and regulations to implement the resolution regarding the participation of the Army in the elections, and it is not reconsidering the eligibility of the Army personnel to participate in the elections."

One of the two ruling parties has expressed a desire to reconsider the participation of the Army, but the rest of the parties in the committee and the opposition parties and the Yemeni Socialist Party, in particular, opposed such an idea.

A number of opposition parties are against the redeployment of Army units to new barracks especially after the constituents have been delimited, claiming that such an action would upset the demographic balance that was the basis for the delimitation.

AL-SAHWAH newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Yemeni Front for Reform, has warned against any foul play or steps that do not support the people's confidence in the impartiality of the elections. Such a matter could adversely affect the situation in the country due to a weak parliament that is incapable of playing its role, which could lead to a weak parliamentary practice that results in widespread disappointment among the people. The paper added that small camps have been formed from bigger camps to maximize the benefit of the right of the armed forces personnel to exercise their right to vote inside their camps. It called for a suitable mechanism to enable the military to exercise its rights away from any outside influence or superimposed directives.

#### **Sons of Yemen Party To Participate**

93AE0320B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
25 Jan p 6

[Text] The Sons of Yemen Party announced that it will participate in the coming parliamentary elections, indicating its commitment to all of the guarantees of the elections' freedom and impartiality. In a statement issued yesterday at the conclusion of the fourth session of the central committee of the party, which lasted for four days, the party expressed its surprise at being deprived of participating in the election committees and the annulment of its right to participate in the principal

subcommittees in the governorates and at the election centers, considering the decision to be illegal.

The central committee expressed the party's sorrow about the intentional foul play of most of the committees, which were formed to meet the needs of certain people or certain parties without consideration for the social circumstances of the country or the bases and criteria set by the Higher Elections Committee.

A press communique by the central committee indicated that in spite of the parties absolute support for the members of the armed forces and the police to participate in the elections, it does not approve of the arrangements to use the military and the military camps to alter the results of many ballots by counting the military camps part of the constituency in which they are located. Subsequently, the party is of the opinion that the just solution to this problem is the adoption of the proposal that had been previously submitted by its representative to the elections committee, who suggested that the soldiers and the officers in the camps cast their votes for the candidates in their home constituencies and that the candidates be allowed to enter the camps to explain their platforms. The statement expressed the party's satisfaction with the progress toward the elections, which will be held April 27, and expressed its hope that the elections will be free and impartial and without interference by the authorities or their parties. The statement added that "withdrawing Dr. Hasan Bazar'ah, the party's representative to the Higher Election Committee, was done on the recommendation of the party's executive committee, which was acting on a resolution of the central committee."

The statement issued at the conclusion of the fourth session under the leadership of the party Chairman 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Jafari, stressed the need to achieve consensus and understanding among all the political powers in the country to guarantee that the elections will take place as scheduled and to put an end to the situation that has prevailed since 21 November. The discussions at the central committee meeting focused on three basic axes that were used to evaluate current events in Yemen, studied the organizational situation, and discussed the party's preparations to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.



## AFGHANISTAN

## Statistics on Repatriation Rate of Refugees

93AS0518A Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English  
24 Jan 93 p 11

[Text] The figures representing the number of Afghan refugees returning to Afghanistan from 9-14 January 1992 [as published] shows a quite considerable rise from 152 on Saturday 9 January to 385 on Wednesday 13 January 1993 as illustrated on the attached schedule. However, on the last day of the week this figure declined sharply to 193. The change in policy regarding the payment of rials instead of dollars to the returnees, under cash grant programme, seems welcomed by the returnees.

The next Border Exit Station (BES) is scheduled to open tentatively mid-February 1993 at Milak, Sistan-Baluchestan Province. UNHCR [UN Commission on Human Rights] is working for necessary arrangements to

cope with this development. Other BESs are under consideration by BAFIA [expansion not given] and UNHCR.

The International Consortium for Refugees in Iran (ICRI) is currently having 2 staff members based in Tehran. These 2 staff members are preparing for and assist in the establishment of NGOs [Nongovernmental Organizations] in Iran in order to participate in the Afghans repatriation operation.

UNHCR expressed to the authorities a serious concern about a report of some 50 Afghans who were forced to repatriate. They denied such a fact, but promised to look into the matter.

## Average Daily Repatriation Between 8-14 January 1993

Total Average Day	242
Singles	53
Families	189
Family Size	5

## Repatriation of Afghan Refugees From Dogharoun Border

Date	No. of Families	Adults				Children under 15	Total
		Male		Female			
		Single	Family	Single	Family		
07 Jan 93	1,305	834	1,705	12	1,608	3,616	7,775
08 Jan 93	FRIDAY (WEEKEND HOLIDAY)						
09 Jan 93	27	31	38	0	10	73	152
10 Jan 93	33	40	46	0	3	94	183
11 Jan 93	34	46	47	0	2	122	217
12 Jan 93	53	67	75	0	6	174	322
13 Jan 93	67	84	90	2	4	205	385
14 Jan 93	29	48	38	1	5	101	193
Total	243	316	334	3	30	769	1,452
Grand Total	1,548	1,150	2,039	15	1,638	4,385	9,227


## Average Daily Repatriation (from 1 Dec 92 to 14 Jan 93)

Total	243
Singles	31
Families	212
Family size	5

## Weekly Breakdown: Singles/Families

Date	Singles	Families	Total
01-07 Dec.	335	1,095	1,430
08-14 Dec.	237	1,585	1,822
15-21 Dec.	103	1,500	1,603
22-31 Dec.	61	2,010	2,071
01-07 Jan.	110	739	849
08-14 Jan.	319	1,133	1,452
Total	1,165	8,062	9,227

Weekly Breakdown Chart by Singles/Families



## IRAN

### Tobagan Students Arrested for Smuggling Heroin

93AS0449G Tehran ABRAR in Persian 26 Dec 92 p 4

[Text] Two Tobagan nationals were arrested at the Bazargan border for carrying 1.22 kg of heroin while leaving the Islamic Republic.

According to IRNA reporter, quoting the Public Relations Office of the Ideological and Political Office of the security zone of West Azarbaijan, these two persons, by the names of "Siyun Simon," son of Tony and "Jamal Abdolkarim," son of Ebrahim, had swallowed some of the narcotics and had hidden the rest in their bodies.

After the arrest, the accused were sent along with the discovered substances to the judicial authorities for legal action.

According to an official in the Public Relations Office of the security zone, the accused were students studying at a higher education institution in our country.

According to the latest report, the accused are detained in the Baku area.

Tobago is an island country located in South America.

This island, of which the capital is Port of Spain, has a population of nearly 2 million, of which 6 percent are Muslims and 94 percent are either Christians or Hindus.

### Construction of Technical Training Centers Planned

93AS0449C Tehran ABRAR in Persian 27 Dec 92 p 9

[Text] Bandar 'Abbas. IRNA. In order to expand job training, 75 technical and vocational training centers will be created in the country.

Engineer Gharibani, the head of the Labor and Social Affairs Committee of the Majles, made this announcement and added: These centers are under construction in various provinces of the country, including one center in the province of Hormozgan.

He said: So far, 50 percent of the construction operations of the project of the Technical and Vocational Training Center of Bandar 'Abbas, with 750 million rials in funds has been completed on five hectares of land.

Engineer Gharibani pointed out: This center will be active in training in metal work, turnery, industrial and construction drafting, and repair of audio and household appliances, with 560 trainees.

Stating that the labor law is not observed in some of the departments and government companies, he said: Because of the importance of the issue, we request the Article 90 Committee to oblige such organizations and departments to carry out the labor law in regards to workers.

Concerning the employment of unemployed individuals, he said: This project, after reexamination, will be offered to the Majles, and with its ratification a significant percentage will be added to the employment in the country.

### Report on Progress of Qeshm Electricity Project

93AS0449B Tehran ABRAR in Persian 23 Dec 92 p 9

[Text] Bandar 'Abbas. IRNA. So far, 85 percent of the operations of the electricity outreach on Qeshm Island through the sea has been completed, and this project will become operational by early 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994].

Engineer Musazadeh, the deputy director of regional electricity of Hormozgan, made this announcement and added: In order to carry out this project, two masts about 30 and 40 meters high have been installed on land, and work on another two masts of 138.5 meters in height and 135 tons in weight in the sea is about to be completed.

He said: This project is under way with 470,125,000 rials and 21,491,000 German marks.

The deputy director of regional electricity of Hormozgan added: The final capacity of this electrical line will be 436 megavolt amperes and 230 kilovolts [kV], but due to the need to continue that line up to the 230-kV post in the west of Bandar 'Abbas and create a 230-kV line on the island, complete operation of the project is not possible at the present time.

He said: Most of the implemental operations of the project, except for the floating and sinking of the foundation for High Mast No. 2, have been or are being handled by Iranian experts. Announcing that the electricity outreach to Qeshm Island through the sea is designed in a manner that it would not interfere with the traffic of vessels, he added: This project is under way on land in the Pehel Region and on Qeshm Island near the village of Laft.

With the completion of this project, electricity outreach to Qeshm through the nationwide network and the Bandar 'Abbas 1,280 megawatt [MW] power plant of Bandar 'Abbas will be made possible. According to the latest statistics, Qeshm Island has a population exceeding 60,000 people and at the present time has five 3-MW diesel generators and one 3-MW natural gas generator, which are insufficient for the needs of the population, and many of the villages lack electricity. Because water for the island is provided through the fresh water of "Kanha," shortages and electricity blackouts, particularly in summer, hurt the people and also cause the residents of the island to confront water shortages.

#### **Funds Allocated for Construction of Fishing Port**

93AS0449A Tehran ABRAR in Persian 24 Dec 92 p 9

[Text] Abadan. IRNA. The National Headquarters for Reconstruction allocated 350 million rials in funds to continue the construction of the "Ghamijeh" fishing port on the shores of the Arvand River in Abadan.

This statement was made by Engineer Mirzadeh, the deputy president for executive affairs and head of the National Reconstruction Headquarters, in a visit to "Ghamijeh" fishing port, located at the mouth of the Arvand River.

Stating that 200 million rials has been allocated to provide electricity to this port, he emphasized expediting the trend of reconstruction of this important fishing port.

Of the Ghamijeh fishing port on the shores of the Arvand River in Abadan, 50 percent has been completed, with 190 million rials in expenditures, and when this fishing port is completed, 1,700 fishing motorboats of the people of the Arvand shores can dock at this port.

This port, which has a dock 6.5 meters deep, at high tide can admit vessels of 50 to 150 tons.

Eng. Mirzadeh, accompanied by the governor general of Khuzestan and directors general and officials of the executive organizations of the province, visited the offices of Abadan Port, the Abadan industrial sites, and the offices of Khorramshahr Port.

#### **Environmental Organization Closes Babolsar Factory**

93AS0449D Tehran ABRAR in Persian 28 Dec 92 p 4

[Interview with Mohammad Reza Roshanzamir, director general of the Environmental Office of Mazandaran Province, by IRNA on 27 Dec 1992; place not given]

[Text] The Fiber Manufacturing Factory of Babolsar was closed down yesterday by the environmental organization of Mazandaran Province because [it was] pouring waste into the sea, polluting the surface water, and creating a nuisance for neighboring residents.

Mohammad Reza Roshanzamir, the director general of the Environmental Office of Mazandaran Province, said yesterday to an IRNA reporter: The Fiber Manufacturing Factory of Babolsar was closed down by the Prosecutor's Office of Babolsar and the commander of the security forces of District 1, because of its refusal to heed the frequent warnings of the Environmental Office of Mazandaran Province and because of the numerous complaints by the people.

He added: Resumption of production in this factory will depend on the full implementation of the project to install and operate waste refinery facilities.

#### **Official Discusses Zanjan Economic Developments**

93AS0439A Tehran ABRAR in Persian 21 Dec 92 p 9

[Interview with Majid Kimiaqalam, director general of the Zanjan Department of Commerce, by ABRAR; place and date not given]

[Text]

#### **Director General of the Department of Commerce of Zanjan:**

#### **In Light Industry Production, Zanjan Is Second Province in the Country**

In ceremonies to open the export and import seminar of the province, Mr. Kimiaqalam, the director general of

the Zanjan Department of Commerce, said: All merchants and owners of production units may make use of the data bank complex of the Iranian Export Development Center.

Zanjan. ABRAR Correspondent. Majid Kimiaqalam, the director general of the Zanjan Department of Commerce, in an exclusive interview with ABRAR's correspondent, enumerated the programs of this department in working towards the economic goals and policies of the government; the problems of the distribution of foodstuff to the public; the establishment of permanent exhibitions for direct supply of goods; the follow-up, operation, and funding of the Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines in the province; the data gathering and data bank project for production in the province with regard to industries, agriculture, and handicrafts; the follow-up and establishment of the branch office of the carpet company in the province; the active presence of foreign exhibitors in the country; and preparation for holding and identifying the potential production and exports from the province.

Mr. Kimiaqalam, the director general of the Zanjan Department of Commerce, said: Since the beginning of the formation of the Islamic regime, with the devising of the large Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the Ministry of Commerce has had to play an active, constructive, and effective role in devising the economic plans, developing nonoil exports, putting potential resources and talents into action, guiding the resources towards foreign trade and the acquisition of the economic, monetary, and foreign currency needs of the country.

Mr. Kimiaqalam added: In this connection, since 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991], the Office of Foreign Trade has been established in the central provincial Departments of Commerce and in most new organizations that have started activity since 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992]. Among the goals and duties of this office are:

The implementation of the law of export and import regulations and related instructions and laws.

Carrying out the duties concerning the Administrative Office of the Export Development Council of the province.

Gathering statistics and data on internal production of the province.

Examining production in excess of consumption in the province for the purpose of marketing and export to other countries and to mutually procure for the needs of the province through imports from other provinces and countries.

Identifying and guiding actual and legal persons and local merchants to export and import goods in terms of creating the necessary facilities.

Taking the necessary steps in the area of holding specialized export exhibitions, direct supply of goods exhibitions, and exhibitions abroad to identify the resources of the province.

Issuing release-of-goods permits to the Customs of the country within the bounds of the authority conferred from the center and carrying out other duties included in the duties of the organization of the central office.

Also, among the programs that are under way by the Central Office, while carrying out its legal duties and moving in the direction of the goals of the economic policies of the government, are:

Holding direct goods supply exhibitions in the province.

Following up the operation and establishment of a Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines in the province.

The establishment and follow-up of branch offices of the carpet company in the province.

The statistics data bank project for the production of the province in the area of industries, agriculture, and handicrafts and the issuance and renewal of trade permits.

Mr. Kimiaqalam said: The most major task that has stated is to start exports from the province, including industrial, agricultural, handicrafts, and mines exports.

#### **1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994] To Be the Year of the Blossoming of the Central Office of Commerce**

Mr. Kimiaqalam added: The province of Zanjan has potential talent that the commerce complex intends to develop. For this purpose, initially the Chamber of Commerce must have a data bank in order to help farmers and investors. Alongside this issue is the issue of training. This training is at the present done in various sectors.

About one-third of the forces of the Department of Commerce are acquiring bachelors degrees, and the training classes on exports were also held from 15-17 Azar [6-8 Nov].

#### **Direct Supply of Goods**

The director general of the Zanjan Department of Commerce said concerning the exhibitions for the direct supply of goods: The establishment of exhibitions on the direct supply of goods is one of the goals of the serving government. Of course, in cities where resources are available to the Departments of Commerce, they operate directly, and where there are no resources, the Urban and Rural Cooperative Organization operates.

In continuation, Mr. Kimiaqalam added: Throughout the province of Zanjan we have exhibitions at two different times every year, the first being close to the time that schools open—in fact, this year we held our fourth exhibition, which went very well—and the second is held near the new year, when, God willing, on the



whole, we will have direct supply of goods exhibitions throughout the province, which we intend to maintain at a high level, both in terms of quality of goods and control over prices.

Brother Kimiaqalam added: Here, I ask all the honorable producers, especially those producers working in Zanjan, to come, open a file, and acquire pavilions in the exhibitions and to offer their goods, to the best of their abilities, at low percentages.

#### **Urban and Rural Cooperative Organization, the Permanent and Direct Supplier of Goods**

Mr. Kimiaqalam said in this connection: The problem of space is one of the major problems with the direct supply of goods in Zanjan. Permanent exhibitions require space of at least 2,000 square meters under construction, and at the present time due to the lack of such space, the places that are available to the urban and rural consumer cooperative organization are being used. At the present, pavilions are operating there and are engaged in the direct supply of goods on a permanent basis.

He added: Of course, in every city where the officials cooperate with us and assist the Department of Commerce in terms of space, certainly we shall establish permanent exhibitions in rapid succession. At the present, we have a project under way to procure land and establish a permanent industry and commerce exhibition in Zanjan. It should not go unsaid that this exhibition will not only be private but will also involve the direct supply of goods.

With regard to the issue of prices in this exhibition, about which some customers complain, we do not price the goods. Rather, the prices of the goods offered are determined by the market and are set at least 20 percent below the market price. In this respect, by inviting the trustees of the guild, and after numerous studies, a reasonable percentage will be added to the price of goods and then they will be sold at this exhibition.

The director general of commerce added: I have a complaint about the industrial units, as to why they do not have an active presence in the exhibitions. I hope all the units, including the producers of handbags and shoes, household appliances, stationary, clothing and textiles, and foodstuff, will participate in the exhibition that we have for the new year with interest and significant activity, in order to make the new exhibition much more interesting and comprehensive than the previous ones.

#### **Central Office of Commerce, in Charge of Distribution of Goods**

Concerning goods that were formerly distributed by the Departments of Commerce, Brother Kimiaqalam said: At the present, most are produced and imported with competitive foreign currency or with floating foreign currency. For this reason, the goods that are priced and

distributed by the Central Office of Commerce are procured with floating foreign currency. For example, concerning tires for cars, I must say that small tires are exempt from the distribution system, but the large sizes for busses and trucks are provided through the Central Office of Commerce.

In regards to other goods, such as household appliances, it must be said that we have a series of deferred allotments from past years that are delivered by factories on the basis of signed agreements, and because they are not massive amounts, efforts are being made to deliver them to places to be offered to the consumer directly.

In regards to essential goods (rationed goods), I must say that as in the past the step-by-step distribution of these goods will continue, as long as the government intends to pay subsidies.

#### **We Must Teach the Private Sector How To Expand Exports**

The director general of commerce said concerning the future establishment of permanent industrial and commerce exhibitions and the expansion of exports: Zanjan is located along the route between Iran and Europe. For this reason, it must be used as an export and logistic terminal for the central provinces, so that all stages of goods export take place in this province, and the border provinces merely control the exit of goods. In this connection, the province must have buildings and be equipped with refrigeration. He said: The creation of industrial, commercial exhibitions in the province can contain all the products of the various provinces of the country and prepare them for the competition and expansion of exports. Also, it can accept the products of other countries willing to create exhibitions in Iran. This will have a significant effect on the economic growth of the province.

Mr. Kimiaqalam added: The second permit of the future programs of the office is the division of the Office of Guilds and Merchants. This office has started its work on an expansive level. The most important steps under way are: Identifying the unlicensed industrial units, giving identification cards to these units, providing training to the guilds to familiarize them with the laws of the guild system.

#### **Establishment of Guild Union and Supervisory Committees in the Province**

The director general of the office of commerce added: In order to support and have sufficient information about this complex, we have also employed the computerized division of this office so that in the future the situation will not be such that we would have so many of some units to cause inflation and so few of others that they would be unable to respond to the needs of the people. God willing, with the precise data and statistics we will be able to improve the situation of the production and distribution channels.

To be continued.

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19 MARCH 1993